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Article
Seeking Truth for Power: Informational
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking
Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser, and
Edward Parsont
"The ... power that is involved here is the power to get in-
formation from those who best can give it and who are most in-
terested in not doing so."
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).
Information is the lifeblood of regulatory policy. The effec-
tive use of governmental power depends on information about
conditions in the world, strategies for improving those condi-
tions, and the consequences associated with deploying different
strategies.1 Indeed, this need for information has led legisla-
tures to create specialized committee structures, delegate policy
authority to expert agencies, and develop administrative proce-
dures that encourage analysis. 2 Although legal scholars have
extensively debated procedures and reforms designed to im-
prove the analytic and scientific basis of regulatory policymak-
ing,3 they have paid relatively little attention to how regulators
t We are grateful to Peggy Chen for research assistance in connection
with Part III, and to Miriam Avins, Stephen Breyer, James Conrad, Richard
Craswell, Jason Scott Johnston, David Lazer, Kevin McDonald, Jane Mans-
bridge, Ryan Scott, Stuart Shapiro, Peter Strauss, Jeff Strnad, Sam Walsh,
and participants in seminars at the John F. Kennedy School of Government
and the Stanford Law School for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Copy-
right © 2004 Cary Coglianese and the Minnesota Law Review Foundation.
1. As Justice Breyer has written, "[tihe central problem of the standard-
setting process and the most pressing task facing many agencies is gathering
the information needed to write a sensible standard." STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109 (1982). See generally AARON WILDAVSKY,
SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS (1979).
2. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 46
(1991); Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. et al., An Informational Perspective on Ad-
ministrative Procedures, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 283, 285-86 (1999).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993);
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gain the information they need for making and implementing
regulatory policy.4 Yet the value of any type of regulatory
analysis ultimately depends on the quality and reliability of the
information on which it is based.
Many information-gathering efforts by regulatory agencies
look more or less like conventional scientific analyses, such as
when an environmental agency studies how pollutants travel
through groundwater or a public health agency conducts epi-
demiological research. 5 However, much needed information will
not emerge from policy-relevant scientific research. In particu-
lar, regulators need detailed and accurate information about
the operations of private business enterprises to understand
the scope and cause of regulatory problems, and to craft effec-
tive solutions to them.6
Government regulators are usually poorly positioned to
gather information about business operations, or at least to
gather it cheaply. Often, the best source of information about
the risks of products, the behavior of individuals and firms, the
costs of remediation or mitigation, or the feasibility of different
technologies will be the very firms that the government agency
regulates.7 While these firms have an incentive to share favor-
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001);CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2002); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinz-
erling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protec-
tion, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, ANew Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and WiderCost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489 (2002); Richard W. Parker,Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003).
4. Although scholars have yet to analyze systematically the strategic orgame-theoretic considerations regulators face in obtaining that information
through different means, they have recognized that regulatory officials do
need information. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 112 (noting that "the in-formation problem is central and endemic to the standard-setting process");JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 643 (5th ed. 2003) (observing
that "[s]ound decision making obviously requires good information"); PETER L.STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 870 (9th ed.1995) ("Information is itself the raw material that fuels the implementation,
even the shaping of statutes .... "); Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 128 (2003)(acknowledging that "[e]ffective regulation demands large quantities of infor-
mation").
5. For discussion of the role of science, science policy research, and sci-
ence advisors in government decision making, see SHEILA JASANOFF, THE
FIFTH BRANCH (1990).
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. Cary Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Dis-
turbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & SOC Y REV. 735, 749-50 (199Q)
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able, self-serving information, regulators also need accurate in-
formation that private firms do not want to disclose. How does
a regulator learn about and acquire information from an indus-
try that will suffer if such needed information is revealed?
In this Article, we analyze regulators' gathering of infor-
mation from firms as a strategic game. In Part I, we discuss the
types of information that firms possess and regulators need. We
then analyze the payoffs for regulated firms in keeping this in-
formation to themselves, arguing that silence by firms within
an industry resembles the well-known problem of collective ac-
tion.8 In Part II we discuss the strategies, and in Part III the
tactics, available to regulators to penetrate a regulated indus-
try's silence and gather information needed to develop effective
regulation. Although regulators cannot typically offer explicit
side payments to firms to induce them to release information,
they can deploy a variety of mechanisms to try to gather infor-
mation from those whom the agency will target for regulation.
Indeed, selective forms of what might be considered "regulatory
capture" by individual firms may well be desirable from the
standpoint of the public interest in some cases, if in the process
firms cede information that permits regulators to craft more ef-
fective and efficient regulatory policies. 9
In Part IV, we consider the relative virtues of the strate-
gies and tactics discussed in Parts II and III and theorize about
conditions under which each will be appropriate. Significantly,
we discuss the tensions between regulators' need to gather in-
formation from industry and the kinds of administrative proce-
dures that have arisen over the past several decades to provide
legislators and others an opportunity to oversee the work of
government regulators. Many administrative procedures have
furthered the objective of transparent government decision
making, almost as if transparency were an unalloyed good. Yet
while transparency serves important goals, it also inhibits
some beneficial government activities. In this Article, we call
attention to a little recognized tension between two core princi-
ples of contemporary administrative law: transparency and in-
("[A]gency staff members depend heavily on outside groups for information.
Effective regulation of an industry depends ... on knowledge of how that in-
dustry works. Agency staff members routinely turn to organizations in the
regulated community to provide this information.").
8. See Edward A. Parson, Richard Zeckhauser & Cary Coglianese, Col-
lective Silence and Individual Voice: The Logic of Information Games, in
COLLECTIVE CHOICE 49 (Jac C. Heckelman & Dennis Coates eds., 2003).
9. See infra notes 111-30, 186-97, and accompanying text.
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formed, expert decision making. We conclude that regulators'
need to secure information from those they regulate provides a
reason for preserving some degree of opacity in an otherwise
transparent and accountable regulatory process.
I. INDUSTRY INFORMATION AND
REGULATORY DECISION MAKING
Disparities in access to information have emerged as an
important theme in the study of regulation. The existence of in-
formation asymmetries between producers and consumers is
widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory inter-
ventions in the marketplace, including requirements that firms
disclose information.O Asymmetric information also lies at the
core of the principal-agent theory that has become central to
the study of bureaucratic decision making."t Analysts describ-
ing the regulatory process have focused on the strategies that
legislators-and other governmental overseers of administra-
tive agencies-use to overcome their information disadvantages
vis-A-vis regulatory officials.12 Yet while the general problem of
asymmetric information dominates the contemporary study of
10. See BREYER, supra note 1; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 3 (1990); see also infra note 17 and accompanying text. The use ofinformation disclosure as a regulatory strategy has received considerable at-
tention. See MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE (2002); Bradley C.Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Paul
R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental
Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155 (1998); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics
and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L.REV. 1795 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informa-
tional Standing.- Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999).
11. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING
POWERS (1999); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001). The
regulator (or administrative agency) is typically treated as the agent, while
the legislature or executive is treated as a principal. For a discussion of prin-
cipal-agent theory, see PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
12. See Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Administrative Process
and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L.REV. 499 (1989); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures asInstruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Barry R.Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON.
765 (1983).
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regulation, the asymmetries between regulators and those they
regulate has escaped sustained attention.
13
In this first part, we consider the nature and degree of
regulators' informational dependence on those they regulate.
We begin by discussing the importance of information in regu-
latory decision making, and then explain why industry usually
disproportionately possesses the information needed to craft
good regulatory policy.
A. REGULATORS' NEED FOR INFORMATION
Government regulation is usually justified on the basis of
three main types of market failures: 14 lack of competition (as in
13. The existence of information asymmetries between regulators and
firms has certainly been recognized. See, e.g., Glenn Blackmon & Richard
Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory Process, 9 YALE J. ON
REG. 73, 104 (1992) (noting "the principal-agent relationship between the
regulator and firm" and the firm's "advantage of superior information"); Paul
L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 18 (1986) (noting that "the regulator's information is as-
sumed to be inferior to that of the utility's management" and that "the as-
sumption of asymmetric information is quite plausible"); Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1999) (noting that regulators have a difficult
time assessing the costs of regulatory options "because that information is
generally in the hands of the regulated community, which has an incentive to
overstate those costs"). However, virtually no analytic attention has been paid
to the way regulators play the regulatory game to overcome their informa-
tional disadvantage, or to the implications of this particular problem of asym-
metric information for the design of administrative law. In the relevant legal
literature, we find only two extended game theoretic treatments of the infor-
mation asymmetry between regulators and regulated entities. See Jason Scott
Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343 (2002) (providing a game theo-
retic analysis of information provision under different statutory requirements
about cost-benefit analysis); Tracy Lewis & Michel Poitevin, Disclosure of In-
formation in Regulatory Proceedings, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50 (1997) (analyz-
ing the effect on information provision and decision making of different evi-
dentiary standards in regulatory proceedings). This other work, like ours,
takes the information asymmetries in making regulatory policy as a starting
point for analysis. However, it differs in important respects. Johnston focuses
on information asymmetries with respect to compliance costs only, whereas we
recognize asymmetries in information about benefits as well. Lewis and Poite-
vin consider only the context where a regulator must review an application or
petition from a regulated entity, while we analyze that context as simply one
of many institutional arrangements for gathering information. More impor-
tantly, unlike these studies, we tend to view the strategic problem from the
perspective of the regulator, identifying strategies for government to use to
play the informational game embedded within regulatory policymaking.
14. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, MORE BENEFITS FEWER BURDENS (Dec. 1996), available at
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cases of monopoly);15 externalities (the failure of market prices
to incorporate all the costs to society of a particular form of
economic behavior); 16 and a lack of full information about prod-
ucts and services (for prices therefore cannot reflect the true
preferences of the parties).17 For each of these three types of
market failure, regulators need to gather information about the
activities of, and costs and benefits for, individuals and firms.
They must first be able to determine when market conditions
fail to meet the ideal of a well-functioning market. Then they
must identify possible interventions and assess the conse-
quences of adopting each.' 8
http://clinton4.nara.gov/OMB/inforeg/3year-report.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/riaguide.html (directing analysts to identify a "significant market fail-
ure" justifying each proposed regulation); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
GUIDELINES TO STANDARDIZE MEASURES OF COSTS AND BENEFITS AND THE
FORMAT OF ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS (Mar. 22, 2000), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ memoranda/mOO-08.pdf; EDITH STOKEY &
RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 291-308 (1978). But
cf. Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. & Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market Failure,
18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 558 (1999) (arguing that a superficial focus on
market failure can lead analysts to overlook the underlying causes of regula-
tory problems and that attention to transaction costs offers a better approach).
15. Concentration of market power, whether through predatory behavior
or a so-called "natural monopoly," enables firms to obtain rents by reducing
supply below the levels that would arise in a fully competitive marketplace.
See DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 100-07 (3d ed. 1998). Market power provides the justification for
antitrust law and certain kinds of utility regulation.
16. See id. at 94-100. Although manufacturing firms count their private
costs, such as capital, labor, and other inputs, they do not count the costs that
pollution from their factories impose on neighboring communities. Environ-
mental regulation responds to this type of market failure, seeking to alter
firms' behavior in ways that reduce negative externalities.
17. See id. at 107-15. Usually sellers know more about the efficacy and
safety of their products than buyers. In such cases, government regulation
may be needed to overcome the information asymmetries between consumers
and sellers. Labeling and product testing requirements fall into this category.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18. We recognize, of course, that the regulators' information needs will not
be the same for all alternative solutions. For example, regulators do not need
the same information to restrict the quantity of an externality (such as pollu-
tion) as they do to require the adoption of specific control technologies or im-
pose a tax on the same externality. See, e.g., Evan Kwerel, To Tell the Truth:
Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control, 44 REV. ECON. STUD.
595 (1977); Amyaz A. Moledina et al., Dynamic Environmental Policy with
Strategic Firms: Prices versus Quantities, 45 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 356
(2003); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477(1.974). Although the lrn;r. f -. +latory instrument will affect t typ-.n
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To identify whether firms are acting as monopolists, regu-
lators need information about firms' marginal costs of produc-
tion. For utility regulation, they often need to know whether
firms are making the kind of cost-effective choices about tech-
nology or management that they would make if the market
were fully competitive. 19 For social regulation that addresses
externalities or seeks to ensure adequate product disclosure or
safety, regulators need to know about the risks created by dif-
ferent types of products and production processes. Thus, regu-
lators need to know about the nature and magnitude of any
harmful activities or products, as well as the probability of such
harm.
Regulators also need to understand the causes of regula-
tory problems. When the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA) learns of a cluster of automobile acci-
dents, it needs to find out whether the accidents occurred due
to driver error, road conditions, or mechanical problems. For
example, when the Agency initiated a rulemaking in the wake
of blowouts in Firestone tires, NHTSA regulators needed to un-
derstand the extent to which tire separation was caused by fac-
tors such as heat or underinflation of tires, the tires' poor de-
sign or production, or the design or operation of the vehicles on
which the tires were installed. 20
Regulations usually specify actions that individuals or
firms either must or must not take, so regulators need to iden-
tify a portfolio of actions that they might require or prohibit.
Particularly for problems of externalities or product hazards,
regulators need to be able to specify technological or manage-
rial options to change present operations and reduce risk. Envi-
ronmental regulators, for instance, need to know how oil refin-
amount of information a regulator will need in any given context, the regula-
tor will still always need some information about regulatory problems and
their alternative solutions.
19. See Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 13, at 16-17.
20. See generally Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Tires, 67 Fed.
Reg. 10,050, 10,054-56 (proposed Mar. 5, 2002) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt.
571) (analyzing factors leading to tire failure); OFFICE OF DEFECTS
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ENGINEERING ANALYSIS REPORT AND
INITIAL DECISION REGARDING EAOO-023: FIRESTONE WILDERNESS AT TIRES
(Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/hot/Firestone/firestone
report.pdf (presenting competing analyses of the root causes of tire separation
in Firestone tires). After further study, NHTSA eventually did issue new stan-
dards for vehicle tires. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Tires, 68
Fed. Reg. 38,116 (June 26, 2003) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571); see also
Kevin M. McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163 (2001).
2004] 283
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ing, computer manufacturing, and other industrial operations
can generate less pollution. Auto safety regulators need to un-
derstand what steps can be taken to prevent blowouts. Even
when regulations set performance standards, regulators must
often know about solutions in order to choose a feasible stan-
dard or develop appropriate performance measures. 21
Finally, regulators need information about the probable
(and actual, if known) consequences of different courses of ac-
tion.22 These consequences include the extent to which a pro-
posed regulation will deliver social benefits, such as enhanced
safety or public health. They also include other effects, such as
compliance costs, impacts on technological innovation, and the
creation of additional harms or unintended side effects. 23 For
example, if regulators at NHTSA seek to reduce fatalities from
automobile accidents and are considering a requirement that
manufacturers install air bags, they need to know more than
just how well different types of air bags will reduce overall lev-
els of injuries or fatalities. Price increases associated with an
air bag mandate could reduce sales of new and safer cars, or
the air bags themselves might create new risks of harm, such
21. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 110 (noting that in developing a per-
formance standard for tires, NHTSA "needed access to technical, scientific
facts [but] the experts who could deal with [the key policy] questions were in
industry."). The need for industry information is especially pronounced when
performance standards must be explicitly based on what is achievable by ex-
isting technologies.
22. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86,
99 (1986) ("Formulating centralized directives to control complex industrial
and governmental subsystems involves exorbitant information and decision-
making costs. Enormous amounts of data must be centrally accumulated and
analyzed in order to determine desired results and formulate the specific com-
mands needed to achieve them."). The practice of benefit-cost analysis in regu-
latory policymaking presumes that information about consequences is rele-
vant, even if not necessarily dispositive, in making regulatory policy. See, e.g.,
Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environ-
mental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 221 (1996) (defend-
ing benefit-cost analysis as "an economic tool for comparing the desirable and
undesirable impacts of proposed policies").
23. See Johnston, supra note 13, at 1354-58 (discussing regulators' incen-
tives to consider compliance costs). Regulators also need information about the
expected levels of compliance with different regulations, since full compliance
is rarely achieved. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of
Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 560
(1998) (noting the tendency of budget officials to "meet with affected parties to
obtain information so that their projections will more accurately predict tax-
payer behavior"). For a regulator, information about noncompliance with exist-
mm ,,,lcc, ,~o,,rn~o pncti+i o-noan i- ,o ,,a _u, len
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as by deploying at high speeds into the faces of children or
smaller-than-average adults.24
Regulators depend on information for nearly everything
they do.25 The pages of the Federal Register are filled with in-
formation about regulatory problems, alternative solutions, and
their consequences. Agency dockets and the offices of agencies'
staff members contain still more information collected in con-
nection with rulemaking. As Justice Breyer has observed, regu-
lators' demand for information is "central and endemic" to the
making of regulatory policy.26
B. INDUSTRY'S INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGE
When governmental intervention is needed to protect the
public from harms arising largely independent of economic ac-
tivity-such as the transmission of disease or earthquakes and
hurricanes-the relevant information may be acquired by gov-
ernment or independent researchers as easily as by industry.
Agencies may develop their own in-house expertise, and may
also draw upon the expertise of academic researchers, inde-
pendent consultants, or even the staff of advocacy groups.
2 7
Such expertise tends to be general, say on the effects of air pol-
lutants on health.
This kind of general expertise, however, is not sufficient
when regulatory agencies must make decisions to control par-
ticular industry practices.28 Internal agency experts, and even
their outside consultants, will be at a disadvantage. Firms sim-
ply have much better access to up-to-date and fine-grained in-
formation about regulatory problems, potential solutions, and
expected consequences. 29
24. See, e.g., Sam Kazman, NHTSA Air Bag Mandate Misfires,
REGULATION, Winter 1997, at 17.
25. This holds true even if regulators are concerned mainly about protect-
ing their own turf or maintaining their budgets. After all, even parochial regu-
lators need information about their policies to predict and respond to reactions
by interest groups and governmental overseers.
26. BREYER, supra note 1, at 112.
27. Id. at 109.
28. Id.at ill.
29. David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Regula-
tion, in PUBLIC REGULATION 3, 6 (Elizabeth E. Bailey ed., 1987) (noting that
even if regulators do acquire information about firms' production technologies,
demand structures, and factor costs they do so "only with a lag, and indeed, in
a rapidly changing environment, the information that they acquire may be of
only limited relevance to the current situation").
2852004]
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Where government contemplates regulation to protect pub-
lic health or safety, those engaging in the potentially harmful
activity are likely to hold relevant information about the under-
lying problem through the normal course of business, or be able
to obtain such information more readily than the government.
Manufacturing firms, for instance, almost always know much
more than government about the risks associated with their
products, technologies, and processes.3 0 They learn through
their own testing, from reports of complaints by customers or
workers, or just based on their superior understanding of the
properties of their products and processes. It is generally ac-
cepted, for example, that tobacco companies knew about the
dangers of cigarettes and chemical firms knew about health
risks from vinyl chloride emissions decades before government
knew or could have known about them.3 1 Many large compa-
nies have internal tracking systems through which they can
identify risks from their products and manufacturing processes
long before government is able to learn of them.32
Firms' informational advantage over government is usually
even more pronounced for information about possible changes
from the status quo. For example, facilities that emit vinyl
chloride have vastly greater access than regulators to informa-
tion about how to reduce those emissions. 33 While firms may
30. Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regula-
tions, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535 (1996) (noting that firms are "more knowledge-
able about the risks generated by their company's operation[s]").
31. See MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO
LITIGATION IN TOBACCO POLITICS (2002); DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF
INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 182 (2001);
Chemical Reaction, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001, at 62, available at http://www.
economist.com/displayStory.cfm?StoryID=550695.
32. Computer manufacturer IBM, for example, has developed highly de-
tailed in-house databases to track the chemicals used in its production proc-
esses, the exposure of its employees to these chemicals, and these employees'
medical histories. Gerald Hillman, ECHOES: IBM's Environmental, Chemical
and Occupational Evaluation System, 24 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 827 (1982);
Spencer E. Ante, Was IBM Hazardous to Workers' Health?, BUS. WK., Oct. 20,
2003, at 46, 48. Other major companies have implemented systems to track
their impacts on occupational health and environmental quality. See Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Bolstering Private-Sector Environmental Man-
agement, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2001, at 69; R.E. Joyner & Phil H. Pack,
The Shell Oil Company's Computerized Health Surveillance System, 24 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 812 (1982); Maureen T. O'Berg et al., Cancer Incidence
and Mortality in the DuPont Company: An Update, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED.
245 (1987).
33. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation:
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y
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not have the incentive to acquire information about alternative
solutions at the socially optimal level-ignorance is a virtue if
knowledge will lead to pressures to undertake costly changes to
existing practices-these private actors will have much more
experience about how their activities might be modified to re-
duce or solve a problem. For example, automobile manufactur-
ers will be in the best position to identify options for building
safer cars or boosting mileage.
Most significantly, firms are better equipped to predict and
identify the consequences of different regulatory options. Obvi-
ously, firms can better project their costs of producing goods or
services under different regulatory standards. They can also
better identify other consequences. For example, they will know
how long it will take to incorporate new designs into their
products and their manufacturing schedules, relevant informa-
tion for deciding the length of any phase-in period for new regu-
lations. Firms also generally have superior information about
potential trade-offs created by alternative rules. For example,
regulators would want to consider whether changes in the fuel
economy standards for cars would affect crash safety, some-
thing manufacturers can more easily assess.
34
It is often impossible for government agencies to conduct
independent research to reproduce the information held by pri-
vate actors. Even where they try, it is almost always more ex-
pensive or time consuming, since firms have significant advan-
tages in cumulative experience, technical skills, access to data,
and research capacity, not to mention the fact that they own
the production process. When David Kessler, then-
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), de-
cided to build a case for regulating tobacco products, he di-
rected the staff at one of the Agency's chemistry laboratories to
see if they could "scientifically establish that extra nicotine had
been added to currently marketed cigarettes."35 The FDA lab
undertook a "painstaking process" of testing tobacco, paper,
and filters that "was repeated hundreds of times, virtually
around the clock." 36 When the results turned out to be useless,
REV. 691, 695 (2003) (noting that firms "possess the most information about
risks and potential control methods").
34. For a discussion of the potential trade-off between fuel economy and
automobile safety, see NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT
OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS 113 (2002).
35. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 129.
36. Id.
2004]
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Kessler directed the labs to undertake additional studies that
also proved to be of no help: "[T]hey spent weeks searching for
particles of mica that might have been a source of added nico-
tine [but] [n]othing useful showed up."37 Kessler soon discov-
ered much more valuable information from within industry it-
self. When firms already have the needed information, efforts
by government to replicate it are at best duplicative and should
probably be used as a last resort after attempts to extract the
information from industry have failed.
We recognize, of course, that not all information provided
by firms will be accurate, reliable, or helpful, and that relying
exclusively and unthinkingly on the information provided by a
single firm or industry can contribute to biased regulatory deci-
sion making.38 Regulators should certainly not rely on all, or
perhaps even most, of the information volunteered by industry.
Nevertheless, in many instances the best and most valuable in-
formation needed by regulators will be available only from in-
dustry. We can expect industry will share reliable and accurate
information readily in those cases where it supports the inter-
ests of that industry. The problem to which we now turn is how
to get reliable and accurate information from business in those
cases where releasing it does not advance an industry's inter-
ests.
II. THE STRATEGY TO OVERCOME INDUSTRY SILENCE
Government cannot count on self-interested holders of in-
formation to reveal it fully and without bias.39 Neither can gov-
ernment count on its power to compel the disclosure of informa-
tion. Regulatory agencies can only mandate the disclosure of
37. Id. at 130.
38. See PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 17 (1981); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemak-
ing: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 834 (2003) (suggesting
that "because agencies rely so heavily on information about the consequences
of regulatory alternatives from the very interests most affected by regulation,
who therefore know the most about those consequences, agencies over time
become unwittingly biased in favor of those they regulate").
39. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388 (1986) (observing that industry has incentives to
keep regulatory agencies from receiving information they need when setting
regulatory policy); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Informa-
tion Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 207 (2004) (noting that "[clompanies may de-
cide not to be forthcoming with environmental information if they see them-
selves in an ndversqrin,1 rp.Itinship with regulators").
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information when they are so authorized by Congress, 40 and for
many issues they lack such authority.4 1 Even when agencies do
have authority, they must know what to ask for and firms can
always resist or evade government demands. 42 When firms do
release the precise information requested, they rarely generate
anything more-a distinct disadvantage when regulators are
less certain about what they need to know.43 Far better for
regulators is to find a cooperative source that will engage in
give and take, answering follow-up questions, providing back-
ground details that help the regulator fit the requested infor-
mation into a larger pattern, and searching for additional in-
formation when needed.
How can regulators secure information from those they
regulate? In this part, we begin by looking at this question from
the standpoint of an industry. Since regulations affect entire
industrial sectors, the release of relevant and accurate informa-
tion from any actor within a given sector will help the regula-
tor, but likely harm others in the sector-as when one tobacco
company or asbestos manufacturer releases information to the
government about the hazards of its products. The challenge
for an industry, therefore, is to maintain a collective silence.
The information game between regulators and industry
has a complex set of payoffs from information disclosure, and
this complexity provides opportunities for government regula-
tors to elicit the information they need to make effective regu-
latory policy. As we explain in this part, the basic strategy is
for the regulator to discover, exploit, and, if necessary, create
asymmetric interests in the release of relevant information.
The regulator must also address the risk of retribution that any
disclosing party will likely face from others within industry.
40. See generally infra Part III.B.
41. For example, the FDA lacked general subpoena power that it could
use to gather information in its rulemaking involving the tobacco industry. See
KESSLER, supra note 31, at 235.
42. A firm that resists an agency's subpoena usually can avail itself of
several stages of administrative and judicial review. STRAUSS ET AL., supra
note 4, at 904-05. The result is that any firm that "resolutely seeks to block an
investigation can tie up the proceedings for long periods, and have the benefit
of many different views of the correctness of the demand made." Id. at 905.
43. BREYER, supra note 1, at 111 (suggesting that the more industry is
questioned in an adversarial way, "the more narrowly responsive will be its
answers ... and the less likely it is that the information provided in response
to the first set of questions will help when the agency shifts to the second set").
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A. INDUSTRY INCENTIVES AND THE PROBLEM OF
COLLECTIVE SILENCE
The provision of information to support effective public de-
cision making benefits society on net.44 Yet potential targets of
regulation will often lose, and therefore will have the incentive
to yield or withhold information strategically. Targets' deci-
sions to produce information, and to reveal, bias, or conceal
what they hold, will reflect their calculated attempts to influ-
ence the knowledge and perceptions of regulators so as to pro-
mote public decisions that either reduce their anticipated costs
or increase their private benefits. 45
Firms usually have an interest in maintaining silence, in
withholding or not even generating information that would
help government regulate.46 After all, the more regulators learn
about individual firms' technological capabilities, the more able
44. See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 154 (1992) ("Information by its
very nature tends to be a public good; it can be acquired by another party
without destroying its productive value to those who already possess it."); Karl
Claxton, Bayesian Approaches to the Value of Information: Implications for the
Regulation of New Pharmaceuticals, 8 HEALTH ECON. 269, 271 (1999) ("Infor-
mation is non rival and a public good...."); William Mock, On The Centrality
of Information Law: A Rational Choice Discussion of Information Law and
Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1085 (1999)("The cost structure of information, including the ease of reproducing it and
the fact that it is not lost to a transferor, makes most forms of information
public goods .. "); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 103 (1995) ("[I]nformation is sometimes
a public good. Once it is available at all, or to anyone, it may well be available
to everyone or to many people.").
45. See ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFDEREGULATION 63 (1983) ("[llnterest groups have an incentive to withhold in-
formation that is inconsistent with their position and to present incomplete orbiased information that supports their views."); Edward A. Parson, The Tech-
nology Assessment Approach to Climate Change, 18 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 65, 66(2002) ("No company or industry has an interest in helping regulators to im-
pose burdens on them.").
46. Our analysis also applies to the selective or biased release of informa-
tion in a way favorable to industry's interests. However, for the sake of our
analysis, we generally treat the informational decision facing industry as abinary one: either disclose truthfully and fully, or not at all. We recognize that
such a simplification abstracts away much of the subtleties in information
transmission, leaving to the side selective transmission, signposting, framing,
and spinning, and all sorts of important questions about interpretation. See
Richard J. Zeckhauser & David V.P. Marks, Sign Posting: The Selective Reve-
lation of Product Information, in WISE CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES, AND
NEGOTIATIONS 22 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996). We make this sim-plifying assumption because our main purpose here is to bring clarity to the
structure of incentives facing industry and the strategies available to govern-
ment to identify and respond to those incentives.
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they will be, all things being equal, to design and justify more
stringent requirements later. Given the nature of information,
once anyone in an industry gives it to the regulator, it usually
cannot be retracted and its release will lead to consequences
that extend beyond the discloser. 47 Thus, all the firms within a
relevant sector will have a collective interest in everyone main-
taining silence.
When no firm's benefits from revealing information out-
weigh its benefits from silence, there is no conflict between in-
dividual and collective interests; silence will prevail. But when
firms' individual interests to reveal conflict with the industry's
collective interest in silence, maintaining silence effectively be-
comes a problem of collective action.48 The collective action
problem arises when there exists some good that all members
of a group can share, but when each group member has an in-
centive to "free ride" by letting the others work to produce the
collective good. For example, all citizens can enjoy the benefits
of a cleaner environment, but each individual's share of these
benefits is usually far smaller than the cost to any single indi-
vidual to lobby successfully for new environmental regulations.
Since individuals will be able to enjoy a cleaner environment
regardless of whether they participated in any collective lobby-
ing effort, each individual will have an incentive to free ride on
the activities of others.
With information, a comparable tension arises between col-
lective and individual interests. Each firm in an industrial sec-
tor benefits from silence, but only if all firms refrain from dis-
closing information to the regulator. Thus, industry faces a
problem of "collective inaction"-to maintain silence.
49
The immediate costs of concealing information are usually
trivial, since silence typically requires taking no action at all;
47. Otto Keck, The Information Dilemma: Private Information as a Cause
of Transaction Failure in Markets, Regulation, Hierarchy, and Politics, 31 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 139, 152 (1987) (noting that "exchange of information is ir-
reversible"). Disclosure by one actor may, of course, be disputed or contra-
dicted by others. In some cases, the release of information by one actor may be
insufficient to meet the regulator's needs, and still more information is needed
from others. We discuss the implications of the order of disclosure infra Part
II.D.
48. The quintessential collective action problem is getting individuals to
make voluntary contributions to a common purpose, such as supporting a mu-
seum or a professional organization. For discussions of the problem of collec-
tive action, see RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
49. See Parson, Zeckhauser & Coglianese, supra note 8, at 56-59.
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instead, the collective inaction challenge becomes severe when
the consequences of regulatory decisions based on information
released differ across firms.50 Some firms might not be harmed.
Some firms may even benefit from disclosure (at least relative
to their competitors). For example, if competitors differ in the
costs of controlling a certain type of risk, it may be beneficial
for a low-cost firm to disclose information about the risk to the
regulator.
B. THE INFORMATION GAME
The real world game among industry participants can best
be understood with the aid of a game theory matrix. In this sec-
tion, we provide an illustration of a simple information game
involving two firms. The lessons, though, readily extend to
cases with many firms.
Consider first a game in which each of the firms maximizes
its payoff through the outcome where both firms maintain si-
lence. (Within each box in Figure 1, Firm A's payoff is listed
first.) If the game is fully symmetric, and the regulator inter-
venes no further, silence can be expected.
In the situation illustrated in Figure 1, Firm A would es-
sentially reason to itself as follows:
If Firm B is going to reveal, I should as well. But if B stays silent, I
also want to remain silent. Fortunately, B is insightful, and will see
that payoffs are highest for both of us in the box where we both main-
tain silence. Thus, I will remain silent.
Firm B would reason equivalently, and silence will be main-
tained.
We have presented the information game using illustrative
payoff structures that are symmetric. However, the expected
payoffs from silence and revelation will often vary from firm to
firm depending on the particular piece of information. Even if
firms always made the same predictions about a regulator's ac-
tions (and, of course, they do not), those actions will affect dif-
ferent firms differently. Regulation can sometimes benefit cer-
50. More precisely, these differences are ones of expected consequences.
The expected value of silence and disclosure for any individual firm will reflect
its predictions about the consequences of the action a regulator will likely take
if certain information were to be disclosed. These predictions will be based onjudgments about the behavior of the regulator, the degree of confidence the
regulator will have in the information, and the responses of other group mem-
bers to the disclosure of that information.
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Figure 1: Information Game with Symmetric Payoffs
Firm B
Maintain Reveal Industry
Silence Information
Maintain
Silence
Firm A
Reveal
Industry
Information
tain firms, for example by raising barriers to entry by competi-
tors.51 Even among comparable firms in the same sector, there
will be differences in the capacity and cost of each firm to re-
spond to new regulations. Unless demand for a product is fairly
elastic, a regulation that increased one firm's costs by, say, ten
dollars per unit would help that firm if it simultaneously in-
creased competitors' costs by twenty dollars per unit. Firms
that discover more benign industrial practices may believe they
could reap a competitive advantage by revealing what they
have learned to the regulator and encouraging the promulga-
tion of new rules that will disproportionately burden their com-
petitors.
In such situations, the payoffs to each firm will no longer
be symmetric. Building on our two-firm example, Firm B could
actually gain from the revelation of information, particularly if
Firm A remains silent. A game theory matrix to reflect such a
case is shown in Figure 2.
In this new game, Firm B will reveal, since this is its pre-
ferred strategy no matter what Firm A does. If Firm A antici-
pates this, it will reveal as well, so as to receive four rather
than zero.
51. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 5-6 (1971).
10,10 0,8
8,0 6,6
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Figure 2: Information Game with Asymmetric Payoffs
Firm B
Maintain Reveal Industry
Silence Information
Maintain
Silence
Firm A
Reveal
Industry
Information
These matrices reveal a danger if firms do not know their
counterpart's type. It may be that both firms have the payoffs
of Firm A, but either or both of them may worry that the other
firm has payoffs like Firm B's-or even that the other firm may
think that it has payoffs like Firm B's (even though they are
really like Firm A's). A firm that worries in this way can be ex-
pected to reveal. Thus, although there may be a stable equilib-
rium where both maintain silence, sufficient uncertainty about
payoffs may prompt one or both parties to reveal.
These examples have treated the regulator's role as fixed.
However, as we will develop further in the next section, regula-
tors can influence firms' payoffs in the information game to
help those firms that disclose. For example, imagine that the
payoff to Firm B for revealing when Firm A stayed silent had
originally been a nine, not an eleven (upper right box in Figure
2). In such a situation, if the regulator were able to push Firm
B's payoff of nine up to an eleven, it would provide that firm
with a dominant strategy to reveal-that is, revelation would
be better no matter what Firm A did.
Regulators who undertake actions that affect firms' inter-
ests in disclosure follow a strategy well known in criminal law.
Prosecutors routinely cut deals with low-level employees or bit
players in conspiracies in return for information. In a similar
way, regulators may have the ability to turn symmetric situa-
10,10 0,11
8,0 4,6
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tions like those in Figure 1 into a Prisoners' Dilemma, where
both firms have an incentive to reveal, although both would be
better off if they both maintained silence.
Where firms' interests are asymmetric, as in Figure 2,
regulators will likely have an easier time. They will identify
and work on the firm or firms having the greatest incentive to
break silence. For at least three reasons, interests in silence
and disclosure will often be asymmetric. First, as already
noted, regulators may seek to manipulate firms' payoffs for dis-
closure. Even if regulators do not know which firms are more
likely to reveal, offering rewards to cooperating firms would en-
courage the most revelation-prone firm to reveal. Each firm
may worry that some other firm could have an incentive to de-
part from the industry silence equilibrium, and at some point
those worries may reach a level where a firm reveals. In Part
III, we discuss in much more detail the various ways that regu-
lators can reward or punish individual firms based on whether
they disclose information.
Second, payoffs among firms will differ on their own, even
absent rewards from the regulator. As we have noted, not all
firms will oppose the revelation of specific information; some
might even gain a comparative advantage from any resulting
regulation that revelation makes possible.5 2 Asymmetries may
also arise out of different beliefs about the likelihood that si-
lence will successfully stave off new regulation. If it appears to
an individual firm that a regulator intends to issue a regulation
even in the absence of some particular information, that firm
may prefer to be perceived as a "good citizen" and to release
that information in an attempt to shape the details of the new
regulation.53
Finally, firms are made up of individual people whose in-
terests vary. Individual employees or managers within firms
are the people who actually collect, analyze, and store informa-
tion that may be of value to a regulator. Their interests will
not, of course, always be fully aligned with the firm's overall in-
terests; personal payoffs may differ from the payoffs to their
firm. 54 Individuals may not care about the benefits that silence
brings to the firm as an organization, and they may sometimes
find that cooperating with a regulator brings them personal
52. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 75 and 111.
54. John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An
Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS, supra note 11, at 4.
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benefits, such as by making it easier in the future for them to
interact with the regulator on other matters related to their
jobs.
For these reasons, any industry faces a challenge in main-
taining collective silence. To meet this challenge successfully,
the industry needs to be able to threaten retribution on those
who squeal. Retribution can range from various social sanc-
tions inflicted against the executives or managers of a squeal-
ing firm (e.g., yelling at them on the phone or withdrawing in-
vitations to social events), to kicking the firm out of the
industry trade association, to leaking information uniquely
damaging to the squealing firm. 5 The risk of retribution is
clearest for employees who disclose information adverse to
their employers: they lose their current job, and can expect dif-
ficulty finding employment elsewhere in the industry.56
Retribution can be practiced in subtle but important ways,
such as by affecting a firm's or individual's status and reputa-
tion within an industry. A former vice president of government
affairs for a Fortune 100 company in the retail sector empha-
sized this point to us in an interview: "CEOs are on the same
page and know that if one person breaks loose, this has a sig-
nificant impact on the whole industry."57 In discussing a spe-
cific decision his firm had made to cooperate with regulators,
this industry insider described several different types of retri-
bution:
We took a lot of hits from [trade] association leadership and other
leaders in the industry. It gets personal. There's trash talking and
people can remember it later on other legislative issues and decide
not to support us because we didn't support them on that. Occasion-
ally, we found this happened on economic development issues, where
our competitors would try to hold up some new construction.58
The existence of different types of retribution, whether explicit
or subtle, helps reinforce silence within an industry.59
55. Why would firms disclose information adverse to a competitor only as
retribution, instead of disclosing it preemptively? The reason is simple. If a
firm did not hold back, it would then be the squealing firm and would itself be
subject to retribution.
56. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 6 (2003).
57. To ensure candor, the interviews from which we quote in this Article
were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis, a standard practice for elite in-
terviewing in the social sciences.
58. See supra note 57.
59. Of course, this sort of retribution depends on employers or other firms
in the industry detecting the disclosure and determining who revealed the in-
formation. If firms or individuals can disclose information to a regulator with-
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C. INFORMATIONAL STRATEGY FOR REGULATORS
Regulators face two distinct scenarios when trying to se-
cure industry information. In the first, the interests within an
industry are asymmetric and the industry faces a challenge in
maintaining collective silence. The regulator can seek to exploit
these asymmetries and try to secure information from those
who would expect to gain. In the second scenario, all firms'
natural incentives are to maintain collective silence. The regu-
lator will need to create new incentives, by offering rewards or
punishments (or both) for the release of relevant and accurate
information. In this section, we explain how these two scenar-
ios lead to the general strategies available for overcoming in-
dustry silence.
1. Exploit Asymmetries of Interests
Asymmetries of interest arise across different firms when
firms face (or perceive that they face) different levels of harm
from the disclosure of certain information. For example, in the
1970s, aerosol product firms tried to maintain a unified opposi-
tion to a ban on chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) propellants. As con-
sumer resistance to aerosol products emerged, however, the
S.C. Johnson Wax Company broke ranks and publicly an-
nounced that it would remove all CFC propellants from its
products, thus revealing to government decision makers that a
ban would be feasible. S.C. Johnson could take this position be-
cause it had developed water-based propellants twenty years
earlier and used CFCs in only a small fraction of its aerosol
products. 60 The subsequent ban on CFC propellants was much
less adverse to Johnson's interests as it was to other companies'
interests, and it could actually offer the company some com-
petitive advantage, at least in the short term.
To exploit asymmetries, regulators try to find the firms
that are equivalent to the S.C. Johnson Wax Company.6 1 Since
firms differ in the extent to which their business depends on a
out it being known to others that they are disclosing, they can reduce the risk
of retribution. For this reason there exists a heretofore unappreciated value to
secrecy in the regulatory process. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
60. LYDIA Dorro & HAROLD SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR 164, 166 (1978).
61. In the 1970s, NHTSA officials found they could move forward on issu-
ing a tire standard only after one firm in the industry stepped forward: "Only
when a tire firm (Uniroyal) broke ranks and submitted its own proposal for
rating treadwear, traction, and blowout resistance was NHTSA able to develop
a meaningful standard." BREYER, supra note 1, at 108.
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technology or practice of concern to regulators, regulators can
try to elicit information from the firms likely to be affected
least by a new regulation, but that still possess information
that can be generalized across the industry. Firms that have
already invested in strategies with lesser social impacts may
actually prefer to disclose information that will promote regula-
tion, or at least may be less opposed to its release.62 For exam-
ple, prior to issuing a recent notice of proposed rulemaking on
dietary supplements, the FDA engaged in various public out-
reach and information-gathering efforts. The larger manufac-
turers shared information because they hoped that the FDA's
rulemaking "would establish a level playing field for industry,
which would help prevent irresponsible firms from making and
selling adulterated products."63 Firms at the forefront of their
fields sometimes even cultivate close relationships with regula-
tors, so that they can pass along information about innovative
practices that regulators might make obligatory.
There are many differences in firms beyond those between
so-called "leaders and laggards."64 Older firms frequently have
interests that differ from newer firms. Suppliers' interests can
differ from those of manufacturers. Firms selling to regional or
niche markets may differ from firms selling to a broad, national
market. Differences in firms' cost structures, technologies, and
comparative abilities will affect attitudes toward disclosing in-
formation to regulators.
Firms also differ in the degree to which they are regulated.
Some firms are affected by an entire series of regulations is-
sued by a government agency, while other firms are affected by
only a few of the agency's rules. Firms that interact with a
regulatory agency on an ongoing basis will have stronger inter-
ests in open and accurate disclosure of otherwise adverse in-
62. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS AND
LAGGARDS: NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2002).
63. Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or
Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158,
12,160 (proposed Mar. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 111-12).
64. See, e.g., DAVID M. HART, BUSINESS IS NOT AN INTEREST GROUP (AND,
BY THE WAY, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS "BUSINESS") (Kennedy Sch. of Gov't,
Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP02-032, 2002) (arguing that on
many policy issues there are no common positions for all businesses); Marissa
Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Partici-
pates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 262
(1998) (observing based on a study of HUD regulations that "business[es] did
not present a united front").
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formation on any given issue than firms that rarely interact
with the agency; the former have more need to maintain their
credibility with the regulator.
Regulators can also exploit asymmetries inside firms, by
seeking information from employees, the so-called whistle-
blowers. Sometimes regulators receive employee information
passively. For example, New York's attorney general, Eliot
Spitzer, received a tip from a whistleblower in 2003 that sug-
gested illegal market timing and after-hours trading within the
mutual fund industry. This prompted further investigation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and led to new
regulations of the industry. 65
Regulators often do not wait for employee revealers to step
forward. For example, in the FDA's tobacco rulemaking in the
1990s, Commissioner David Kessler admitted that he "badly
needed industry informants who could help [him] piece to-
gether the bits of information ... and make sense of it all." 66 He
directed his staff to track down current and former employees
who might possess information to help the FDA build its case
against tobacco. One informant who the Agency located was
able to "confirm[] that the technology existed to make tobacco
that was free of nicotine," a fact that the tobacco industry had
undoubtedly tried to suppress.6 7
When exploiting potential asymmetries across or within
firms, regulators must protect their sources from retribution.
To this end, they treat sources confidentially. For example, af-
ter providing assurances of confidentiality, FDA investigators
needed to do little more than appeal to civic duty to convince
most tobacco informants to reveal information adverse to their
current or former employers. 68 Regulatory agencies commonly
provide protections for confidential business information, which
allows firms to provide information without competitors' know-
ing what they revealed. 69 Of course, it is also important that
65. Adrian Michaels, SEC Widens Investigation into Mutual Funds, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at 33, available at LEXIS (reporting on SEC probe of the
mutual fund industry launched after Attorney General Spitzer's office received
tip about market timing); CBS News, Meet a Major-League Whistleblower
(Feb. 17, 2004), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/17/60II/main6O0
649.shtml (describing Wall Street insider Noreen Harrington's decision to go
to Attorney General Spitzer's office with information about market timing).
66. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 112.
67. Id. at 115.
68. Id. at 83, 235.
69. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exempts agencies from dis-
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the regulator avoid using the information in a way that would
hint at its underlying source. Double sourcing-revealing only
when other confirmatory information has been obtained
through other means-offers such protection.7 0
Regulators may also offer to protect whistle-blowers
against reprisals from their employers. For example, the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued regulations that
prohibit nuclear facilities and their contractors from firing, re-
ducing the salary, or otherwise discriminating against employ-
ees who report violations to the NRC. 71 The NRC also issued
rules that prohibit employers from including "no-talk" provi-
sions in agreements settling employment discrimination dis-
putes, finding that such restrictions can "have a chilling effect
on communications about nuclear safety, security, or other
matters, and would restrict, impede, or frustrate full and can-
did disclosure to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about
matters of regulatory significance."72
2. Create Incentives
When regulators cannot identify sources that might reveal,
or suspect there are none, they find themselves in the second
closing "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000). In addition,
the Trade Secrets Act provides additional protection for certain confidential
business information. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000). While such protection can be
valuable even when government mandates disclosure, such protection of confi-
dentiality will be even more critical when government is seeking information
voluntarily by exploiting asymmetries of interests, given the potential com-
petitive or retributive consequences if the revealer is found out. The D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has recognized the need to protect the confidentiality of
business information precisely to encourage continued cooperation by industry
in informing government decision makers. See Critical Mass Energy Project v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In an en banc
decision, the court interpreted section 552(b)(4) of FOIA to exempt disclosure
of virtually any business information voluntarily submitted to the govern-
ment. Id.
70. In some cases, regulators will be able, or will need, to use information
leaked to it as a basis for issuing orders for further information. For example,
the tips state officials received about practices in mutual fund firms helped the
SEC know what information to order funds to disclose, something which it has
now done for many financial institutions in the mutual fund business. We dis-
cuss the relationship between the different strategies further in Part II.D.
71. Employee Protection, 10 C.F.R. § 30.7 (2004).
72. Preserving the Free Flow of Information to the Commission, 55 Fed.
Reg. 10,397, 10,398 (Mar. 21, 1990) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 30, 40, 50, 60,
61, 70, 72. 150): see also Employee Protection, 10 C.F.R. § 30.7.
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scenario. In this case, they must create new incentives to break
industry's silence. 73
Regulators can issue information requests under a threat
of a penalty. For example, when the SEC in 2003 ordered mu-
tual funds to turn over information related to possible market
timing and after-hours trading activity, its request detailed the
civil penalties for noncompliance. 74 Even a "voluntary" request
for information may carry an implicit risk that failure to dem-
onstrate good faith compliance might subject the firm to a
closer and more extensive investigation by the regulator.
Regulators can also reward firms that come forward with
needed information. In crafting a new regulation, it is some-
times possible to design a rule, or mode of enforcement, to vary
the burden imposed on particular industries or firms, effec-
tively (though not explicitly) giving favorable treatment to
firms that provide information. As we discuss further in Part
III, some regulatory agencies have even established recognition
programs that try to reward firms that act responsibly and ex-
press a willingness to engage in information sharing with the
agency.
Beyond creating incentives for individual firms, regulators
can use their regulatory authority to shape overall industry in-
centives. If government can credibly signal that it will issue a
new regulation whether or not it receives certain information
from industry, firms may choose to disclose otherwise adverse
facts in the hope of forestalling an even more stringent or costly
regulation.75 Firms may also find some value from acting like
"good citizens" if they think the regulator already has enough
information to create a regulation that will withstand judicial
scrutiny. Regulators, like shrewd prosecutors trying to break
down conspirators, may feign more knowledge than they have.
73. There is a symmetry here with the conventional problem of collective
action. One of the well-known solutions to this problem is the provision of se-
lective benefits. Political interest groups organized to promote collective inter-
ests routinely offer gifts, discounts, magazines, or travel benefits to solicit new
members. They also serve as nodes for valuable networking for business or so-
cial purposes. OLSON, supra note 48; JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS 33-39 (1973); Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of In-
terest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 20-22 (1969).
74. See supra note 65. Section 21c of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 provides for judicial enforcement of SEC information demands and
criminal penalties for failure to comply. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2000).
75. See supra text accompanying note 53; infra text accompanying note
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Finally, industry's response to new regulations can give
regulators information needed to tighten or refine these regula-
tions still further. For example, the Montreal Protocol required
a fifty percent reduction in industry's use of CFCs and estab-
lished a technology assessment panel to identify ways to meet
this target. 76 Since the entire industry now faced incentives for
finding ways of reducing their use of CFCs, participation on the
assessment panel provided an opportunity for firms to pool
their expertise to achieve innovations. 7 7 The results included
new information that proved helpful to industry and yielded
positive externalities: the collective search led to the use of less
harmful chemicals and new technological processes that re-
duced the use of ozone-depleting chemicals by more than
ninety-five percent.78
D. ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
Our analysis of regulators' basic strategies raises three im-
plications. First, effective regulatory decision making depends
on more than just scientific, economic, and engineering infor-
mation. It also requires political information, that is, informa-
tion about the interests and proclivities of affected firms and
individuals. Regulators must understand the various interests
at stake if they are going to try to exploit asymmetric interests,
even when using rewards or punishments. Often information
about such interests comes from ongoing interactions between
regulators and the industries they regulate. Regulators may
also issue advance notices of proposed rulemaking to flush out
interests. In a preplay to the main round of the game, the na-
ture and intensity of firms' responses to regulators' initial for-
ays reveals information about their underlying interests.79
Second, regulators may use both strategies-exploit
asymmetries and create incentives-in tandem, such as by is-
suing a general information request backed up by penalties,
and also separately (and discretely) targeting individual firms
with differential interests to obtain other information. Or they
may combine the two strategies into one effort, such as by re-
76. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
art. III, 1522 U.N.T.S. 31-33, reprinted in 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1541,
1552-54 (1987).
77. EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER 168-69, 242
(2003).
78. Id.
79. See Johnston, sunra note 13, qt 1267--R
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warding those firms already most inclined to disclose. They
may also stage the two strategies when searching for the same
information. Regulators who exploit asymmetries can later try
to create incentives.
In addition, they may use different strategies for different
bits of relevant information. Regulatory problems often have
several plausible causes, and they almost always have several
potential solutions. The value of any particular piece of infor-
mation for the regulator depends on how effectively it fills a
gap in the regulator's knowledge base and how important that
gap is to the regulator's overall decision making. For firms, the
costs and benefits of providing any given piece of information
also vary, depending upon the likely consequences of disclosure.
The regulator will thus wish to downplay or obscure the signifi-
cance of any information it seeks from a potential source, and
perhaps in some cases will even want to pursue different pieces
of information from different actors, so that it will be harder for
any one of them to see how the pieces fit together.80 When act-
ing this way, regulators behave much like the police investigat-
ing a crime. They go around asking many people for small bits
of information and then attempt to piece it all together.
Firms with a hazy picture of the regulator's overall puzzle
will be less likely to assess accurately the value and impact of
the release of any particular piece of information.8' Some firms
will overestimate the value of their information to the regulator
and will therefore resist disclosure; others will underestimate
the regulator's use of what they say, and will release more in-
formation than they otherwise would. For example, in building
its case for tobacco regulation, FDA investigators interviewed
tobacco farmers about some of the experimental crops they
grew in an effort to show how the industry had developed tech-
niques to control the levels of nicotine in cigarettes. 8 2 Undoubt-
80. The regulator will face a tradeoff in deliberately soliciting information
from different sources for the purpose of avoiding showing all its cards to any
single player. The accuracy and usefulness of information may well diminish
as the number of sources increases, especially if different sources use different
units of measurement and the regulator is unable to convert the data into a
common metric. In such cases, the regulator will be better off pursuing infor-
mation from a single source, even if doing so will reveal more fully to that
source the value of the information the regulator needs.
81. Thus, firms have an incentive to cooperate with the regulator when
the regulator cooperates in return and shares information about the agency's
plans. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
82. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 214-15.
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edly, few farmers who talked to Agency investigators fully ap-
preciated how the FDA would use information about their crops
to build a case against the tobacco industry, and surely no ex-
perienced government investigator would have conveyed to
these farmers that the fate of the tobacco industry rested on the
information they were being asked to provide.
A third consideration emerging from our strategic analysis
is that regulators need to consider the order in which they pur-
sue different sources of information.8 3 Regulators will want to
distinguish between sources of information according to how
valuable their information is. It may be better for regulators
first to pursue information from sources possessing lower in-
formation value, building up their base of knowledge so that
they can later maximize what they learn from their most intel-
ligent sources of information. Of course, since regulators often
do not know what they are hunting for, they may not know
which sources will be most valuable until well into an inquiry.
As a general guideline, regulators should try to exploit
asymmetries before attempting to create incentives. A regula-
tor's initial step in any regulatory proceeding should be to de-
termine which firms (or individuals) are likely to have asym-
metric interests with respect to different pieces of relevant
information.8 4 It may take time to find a willing source of in-
formation but, if the agency can afford the delay, this is gener-
ally preferable to mandating disclosure, which sets up an ad-
versarial posture that can be difficult or impossible to
unwind.8 5 On the other hand, when regulators believe that
there is a low probability of finding any cooperative source or
perhaps if the problem is particularly urgent, it may be better
to use their subpoena power at the outset.8 6 Mandatory disclo-
83. Correspondingly, industry's collective ability to inflict retribution on
those who disclose information will also likely vary depending on the order of
revelation. Whether by regulators or by industry, the strongest incentives-
positive or negative-may be applied to those firms who disclose (or threaten
to disclose) first. See Parson, Zeckhauser & Coglianese, supra note 8, at 62-64.
84. See infra Part IV.B.
85. See supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
86. There may also be strategic reasons for regulators to issue subpoenas
before exploring other options, regardless of the relative merits of mandated
disclosure in terms of collecting valuable information. Issuing a subpoena con-
veys to Congress and the public an impression that the regulator is taking
swift action to address a problem and it also tends to put the firms subject to a
subpoena in a bad light, which may distract attention from criticisms of the
regulator. For recent accounts of regulators' high-profile probes into practices
in the mutual fund industry, see Ellen Kelleher, US Extends Probe to Include
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sure may also be more appropriate when regulators are looking
for confirmation of something they already know.
III. REGULATORS' TACTICS FOR
ELICITING INFORMATION
In this part, we consider the specific tactics that regulators
use to exploit asymmetries of interest and to create new incen-
tives for disclosure. Legal commentators generally distinguish
between forms of voluntary disclosure of information and com-
pulsory disclosure,8 7 and pay more attention to compulsory in-
spections and subpoenas which raise issues about privacy and
protection against self-incrimination.88 Yet the tactics available
to regulators are actually quite diverse: (a) disclosure as a pre-
condition for regulatory decisions; (b) mandatory reporting and
access; (c) rewards for disclosure; (d) nonmandatory informa-
tion requests; (e) formal interaction; and (f) informal interac-
tion.
A. CONDITIONING DECISIONS ON DISCLOSURE
Regulators sometimes condition key decisions on the dis-
closure of information by regulated firms.8 9 For example, com-
panies must submit extensive information to the FDA to secure
Intermediaries, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at 16; Adrian Michaels, SEC Puts
Pressure on Mutuals, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2003, at 16, available at LEXIS;
Scott Bernard Nelson, US, State Broaden Inquiry of Funds: More Firms Get
Notes Seeking Information, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 2003, at C1.
87. MASHAW ET AL., supra note 4, at 643 ("Agencies obtain needed infor-
mation.., in a variety of ways. Most of it is provided voluntarily[.] ... How-
ever, some information that government officials require to develop policy...
is not willingly disclosed."); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 194 (4th ed. 2002) ("[A]lmost all the information the agencies receive
from private parties comes in voluntarily. In both adjudication and rulemak-
ing, whether formal or informal, private parties voluntarily submit the facts
about themselves, and they usually answer questionnaires without compul-
sion.").
88. See, e.g., Carlos B. Castillo, Comment, Discord Among Federal Courts
of Appeals: The Constitutionality of Warrantless Searches of Employers' OSHA
Records, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201 (1990); Geoffrey G. Hemphill, Note, The
Administrative Search Doctrine, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215 (1995); Susan M.
McDonough, Note, The Fourth Power? Administrative Searches vs. The Fourth
Amendment, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 195 (1993).
89. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that 39.7% of
all authorized information collection requests are "required to obtain or retain
some kind of benefit." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SMALL BUSINESS PAPERWORK RELIEF TASK FORCE 7 (June 27, 2003) (empha-
sis omitted).
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its approval to market new drugs. 90 The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) requires manufacturers of new aircraft to
submit extensive test results before the Agency will certify the
design as meeting applicable safety standards. 91 While such
transfers of information take place in case-by-case proceedings
instead of general policymaking, the industry information the
Agency gains may prove helpful in subsequent rulemaking by
the Agency.
At times, regulators can use information from firms' appli-
cations submitted to other agencies. For example, to under-
stand the tobacco industry's techniques, the FDA relied on in-
formation submitted to the Patent Office in support of tobacco
companies' patent applications. Tobacco companies touted their
innovative methods of controlling nicotine levels when applying
for patents related to cigarette manufacturing; this information
later helped the FDA build its case that cigarettes were sophis-
ticated drug delivery devices that warranted the FDA's regula-
tory control. 92
Even though regulators may obtain information from indi-
vidual applications, when they require information as a condi-
90. Pharmaceutical firms must file new drug applications that include all
the data and findings from any clinical trial performed on a drug they would
like to market. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000). If the Agency finds that the data
show that the drug meets the requirements for safety and efficacy, it will ap-
prove the drug for market. § 355(c), (d).
91. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 72 Stat. 731 (codi-
fied as amended in 5, 14, 15, 16, 31, 39, 40, 43, 48, 49 and 50 U.S.C. (2000));
Inspection and Tests, 14 C.F.R. § 21.33(b) (2004) (stating that a manufacturer
must make all inspections and tests); Flight Tests, 14 C.F.R. § 21.35(b) (re-
quiring manufacturers to make all flight tests). See generally Mark A. Valetti,
Comment, Preemption of State Law Tort Claims in the Context of Aircraft
Manufacturers, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 699, 705-10 (1994-1995) (describing the
FAA certification process). In addition, the manufacturer must demonstrate
that it has in place a quality control system to ensure that its production proc-
ess will consistently produce aircraft that meet the approved design. See Qual-
ity Control, 14 C.F.R. § 21.139 (noting what data must be provided to demon-
strate quality control); Quality Control Data Requirements; Prime
Manufacturer, 14 C.F.R. § 21.143 (discussing the same); see also Requirements
for Issuance, 14 C.F.R. § 21.135 (providing that certification will be issued only
if an application meets requirements of §§ 21.139 and 21.143). These detailed
plans describe the processes manufacturers use to meet safety requirements,
providing information about each firms' production.
92. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 122-24 (noting that evidence from patent
applications showed that industry had developed the means of manipulating
nicotine levels in cigarettes). Of course, the FDA's efforts to regulate tobacco
ultimately were not sustained in court, as the U.S. Supreme Court held that
tobacco products were excluded by statute from the FDA's jurisdiction. FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., S29 U.S, 120 (2000).
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tion for approval they are often at a disadvantage. Firms have
incentives to submit selective, biased, or even false information
to satisfy disclosure requirements. Moreover, inaccurate sub-
missions are hard to police, particularly if the inaccuracies are
subtle, since regulators usually cannot independently verify the
information firms provide.93 For example, in its application to
market a drug called Oraflex, the pharmaceutical company Eli
Lilly failed to disclose overseas deaths associated with the use
of Oraflex.94 By the time the company pleaded guilty and was
forced to withdraw the drug from the market, the drug report-
edly had caused about fifty deaths in the United States.
95
To be sure, the expected penalties for submitting inaccu-
rate materials will temper any incentives firms have to submit
selective or biased applications. Both the magnitude of the
penalties and the probability of getting caught matter. For re-
peat players who depend on government approvals for their
business, the penalties will include informal ones, such as in-
tensive scrutiny or foot dragging by the agency over future ap-
plications. More formal penalties for false disclosure, especially
if applied to individual decision makers directly, also counter-
act any incentives to mislead if they are large enough. Congress
recognized as much in passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
which increased penalties for corporate fraud and required in-
dividual certification by CEOs of the accuracy of company fil-
ings.96
B. MANDATORY REPORTING AND ACCESS
Regulators can mandate that firms release information or
submit to government audits or inspections, with the threat of
penalties if firms do not comply.97 Mandated information dis-
93. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation From New Drug
Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test
Data, DUKE L.J. 155, 170 (1978) (questioning the ability of FDA officials to de-
tect subtle biases in the data they receive).
94. Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in
Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1148 n.124 (1988); see also
Morton Mintz, Indictment Accuses Drug-Testing Firm of Falsifying Results,
WASH. POST, June 1, 1979, at A9 (describing allegations of falsification by an-
other drug company).
95. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Prod-
ucts, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1348 (1993).
96. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
97. The OMB estimates that 38.4% of all authorized information collec-
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closure can take the form of subpoenas, reporting require-
ments, and government inspections of facilities.
It is well established that Congress and the courts have the
authority to order the disclosure of information. 98 Regulatory
agencies also can compel businesses or individuals to answer
questions or produce documents, as long as Congress has given
them this authority by statute and they request information
relevant to a legitimate agency purpose and not patently un-
reasonable. 99 The courts allow agencies with such authority to
use it to obtain information for rulemaking as well as enforce-
ment.100 Courts have generally deferred to regulators when it
comes to enforcing information requests, even upholding broad
requests for "all papers" or "all documents" related to issues of
concern to the regulator.1 0 1 Indeed, the courts have held that
tion requests "are mandatory where failure to provide the information re-
quired can result in civil, or criminal, sanctions." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
supra note 89, at 7.
98. Congress has the power to compel witnesses to testify or produce docu-
ments so that it can more competently exercise its legislative authority.
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). See generally James M. Landis,
Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40
HARV. L. REV. 153, 189 (1926) (providing historical background on Congress'
rationale for compelling information). Courts can compel the disclosure of in-
formation in litigation, FED. R. Civ. P. 37, 45; FED. R. CRIM. P. 17, which on
occasion will prove to be an additional source of information for regulators.
The litigation filed by smokers yielded documents helpful to the FDA in its
rulemaking on cigarettes. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 205-06, 251-55, 258-59.
99. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 654 (1950); Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (stating that agency sub-
poenas will be sustained unless "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any law-
ful purpose" of the agency). For example, the Federal Trade Commission has
the authority "to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any
matter under investigation." 15 U.S.C. § 49 (2000). However, even when stat-
utes contain authorizations to conduct physical inspections of facilities, the
Supreme Court has held that in certain situations regulators may be required
to obtain search warrants prior to making an inspection in the absence of a
firm's consent. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
100. In re FTC Line of Business Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 702 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 703 ("When the inquiry is conducted pursuant to a lawful pur-
pose and the request is relevant to that objective, its reasonableness will be
presumed absent a showing that compliance threatens to disrupt or unduly
hinder the normal operations of a business."); see also Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. at 652; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 951 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.
1991). The main limitations on agencies' information gathering are political
ones. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 4, at 874 (noting that "the principal
checks on administrative information requirements are legislative and admin-
istrative").
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mere "official curiosity" is a sufficient purpose for mandatory
information requests, provided the information requested per-
tains to a matter within the agency's authority.
10 2
Regulators can also compel firms to file routine reports
that effectively enable government to monitor relevant aspects
of an industry. For example, under the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act (TSCA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
requires companies to disclose scientific studies they have con-
ducted on toxic substances 10 3 and to report data on production
levels of chemicals listed on the Agency's Chemical Substances
Inventory. 04 The EPA uses such data to help set priorities, as-
sess new risks, and establish and implement Agency regula-
tions.1 05 Firms that fail to report the required information can
face court-ordered fines of up to $25,000 per day for each viola-
tion.1 0 6
Mandatory reporting has the advantage that it may over-
come selection bias, as voluntary disclosure would be more
likely to elicit information from an unrepresentative sample of
firms, namely those with favorable information to reveal.
1 07
Unfortunately, such mandatory extractions suffer three short-
comings. First, requests for information can be politically un-
popular, particularly if they require a lot of effort by the indus-
try to respond. To limit government information requests, for
example, Congress has adopted the Paperwork Reduction Act,
102. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652.
103. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d) (2000); Health and
Safety Data Reporting, 40 C.F.R. § 716 (2003).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607; Partial Updating of TSCA Inventory Data Base;
Production and Site Reports, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,438 (June 12, 1986) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 710).
105. Partial Updating of TSCA Inventory Data Base; Production and Site
Reports, 50 Fed. Reg. 9944, 9945 (proposed Mar. 12, 1985) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 710) (stating that the EPA uses the information it receives to "set
priorities for further investigation ... to estimate, along with other data, the
potential for human and environmental exposure to specific substances, to
support the implementation of various TSCA regulations, and to perform eco-
nomic impact analyses for potential TSCA regulations").
106. 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (2000).
107. For an analogous scenario in the regulation of disclosure of informa-
tion to consumers, see Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Con-
sumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 537 (1981) (noting that when disclo-
sure is voluntary "information will usually be disclosed only by sellers of
whom it speaks well"); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Health Claims
in Food Marketing: Evidence on Knowledge and Behavior in the Cereal Market,
10 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 15, 20 (1991) (discussing the incentives of
manufacturers of high-fiber cereal to advertise their health advantages).
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which requires agencies to obtain approval from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) for any information requests
that ask identical questions of more than ten individuals or
companies.10 8 Second, to be effective, mandatory information
requests require that the regulator already have enough infor-
mation to know what issues to ask about. Firms are unlikely to
respond to a subpoena by volunteering information beyond
what is required. Third, it is generally hard for government to
determine whether firms have provided complete responses. A
failure to make any response will be clear, but it is extremely
difficult to demonstrate omission or evasion if the firm re-
sponds with at least some information. A recent amnesty pro-
gram administered by the EPA under TSCA suggests that the
nondisclosure problem can be extensive. The EPA established a
five-year amnesty period, waiving penalties for firms that came
forward with studies on toxic substances they had previously
failed to disclose. 109 Companies disclosed 11,000 old studies
that had previously gone undisclosed.110
C. REWARDS FOR DISCLOSURE
The EPA's amnesty program in effect gave a backhanded
reward for disclosure by reducing a potential penalty. It offered
firms something of value-namely, amnesty-in exchange for
information. Regulators' rewards are often much more discreet.
For example, regulators may become valued and trusted
sources of information about agency activities for industry rep-
resentatives who are valued and trusted sources of information
for regulators.
Regulators can also create rewards by bluffing that they
will recklessly proceed with a costly regulation even if industry
does not disclose relevant information.l"l Firms that fear that
government will proceed on the basis of insufficient information
will sometimes disclose in an effort to avert or soften the even-
tual regulation. In these cases, the resulting reward for disclo-
108. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2000).
109. See Marianne Lavelle, EPA's Amnesty Has Become a Mixed Blessing:
Be Careful What You Ask For, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1997, at Al.
110. Id. Some companies claimed that they had failed to submit the older
studies not because of any obstructionist intent, but due to previous ambiguity
about TSCA regulations. They further claimed that this ambiguity had finally
been addressed by a new EPA guidance. A similar amnesty program for pro-
duction data for chemicals listed on the EPA's inventory apparently netted
new information from about 250 companies. Id. at A18.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 53 and 75.
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sure will be a more sensible or less costly regulation. Of course,
this type of reward will be shared with others in the industry.
Although difficult to document, it is plausible that regulators
sometimes will design rules that subtly reward the individual
firms that provide information. 112 In negotiations over multi-
state tobacco litigation, for example, the Liggett Group sought
special treatment in part because the company had previously
reached a deal releasing documents that revealed the tobacco
industry's efforts to cover up smoking's hazards.
1 1 3
Over an extended time, many opportunities will arise for
regulators to offer implicit benefits to specific firms that release
relevant and accurate information.1 14 In repeated interaction,
especially when information is the currency of exchange, build-
ing a reputation matters because a regulator needs to be able to
trust the information provided by an industry source. By pro-
viding information adverse to its interests, at least once in a
while, a firm can bolster its credibility as an industry source,
making it more likely that the government will grant the firm
some implicit discretionary benefit-if only by believing the
firm other times when information it shares seems self-serving.
Such credibility could prove especially valuable when providing
information about industry costs or technological feasibility.
Regulators also have developed programs that deliver ex-
plicit inducements to firms if they deliver helpful information
to the government. These programs, often justified as efforts to
reward firms for achieving outcomes beyond what existing
regulations require, serve a second purpose: they allow regula-
tors to learn about best practices. For example, in the area of
112. For example, government could adopt a technology-based standard
that locks in a technology that the firm already uses. This would put competi-
tors at a disadvantage, whereas a performance-based standard might not.
113. Tobacco's Crumbling Barricades, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1997, at A22.
Liggett also claimed it could not afford its share of the settlement. CARRICK
MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO 224 (1998). In the end,
however, Liggett was unable to secure an exemption from the terms of the set-
tlement, in large part because the rest of the industry closed ranks. Id. at 224-
25, 233. Although this is an example of information disclosure in litigation, for
a discussion of how large-scale litigation over social issues such as tobacco has
effectively become a form of regulation, see generally REGULATION THROUGH
LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
114. Given that many firms and trade associations are engaged in long-
term, repeated interaction with regulatory officials, they will find benefits over
the long term from cooperative and open dealing with government. ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 156 (1984); see Coglianese, supra
note 7.
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environmental and occupational safety regulation, agencies
now offer explicit benefits to encourage firms to participate in
various pilot projects or reveal information about their man-
agement practices. Firms that commit to taking on extra meas-
ures and are willing to provide the government with more in-
formation about their products or practices than is normally
required receive special recognition, reduced enforcement scru-
tiny, and in some cases outright exemptions from existing
standards. 115
For example, after receiving a series of health complaints
from neighbors of large animal feedlot operations, the EPA be-
gan investigating whether it should take regulatory action to
address the situation. To collect information, the EPA initiated
negotiations with firms to induce them to implement monitor-
ing systems on their facilities to provide the EPA with data on
the pollutants in the air at feedlots.116 In exchange for firms'
willingness to install monitoring devices, the EPA reportedly
offered to "give farm operators amnesty for any Clean Air Act
violations" that the Agency uncovered through the monitoring
program. 117
Another type of inducement is to offer exemptions from ex-
isting regulations.11s The EPA's Project XL, established in the
mid-1990s, allows the EPA to grant waivers if firms show that
they will use alternative methods of pollution reduction that
will yield better environmental results than the methods speci-
fied under current regulations.119 Intel, for example, devised an
alternative strategy for reducing air pollution at one of its Ari-
zona semiconductor facilities in exchange for the EPA's waiving
certain regulatory permitting requirements. 120 Project XL was
115. See generally David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship
Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda,
50 EMORY L.J. 1, 4, 66 (2001); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Policy Op-
tions for Improving Environmental Management in the Private Sector,
ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 2002, at 10, 19 (describing government programs to rec-
ognize best practices).
116. Jennifer 8. Lee, Neighbors of Vast Hog Farms Say Foul Air Endangers
Their Health, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at Al.
117. Id.
118. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and
Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 943, 965-70 (2003).
119. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282
(May 23, 1995).
120. See ALLEN BLACKMAN & JANICE MAZUREK, THE COST OF DEVELOPING
SITE-SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: EVIDENCE FROM EPA's
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designed in part to provide the EPA with information about al-
ternative environmental strategies that the Agency could use to
develop new environmental regulations or revise old ones. 121
Firms applying for waivers must provide the EPA with a sub-
stantial amount of information about the alternative strategies
they propose and submit to an ongoing monitoring regimen. 122
Both the EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) offer public recognition as an induce-
ment to gather information from firms that exhibit best prac-
tices in environmental and workplace safety management.
OSHA's Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP), created in 1982,
has more than 1000 member facilities nationwide. 123 Under the
VPP, OSHA exempts employers from regular inspections if
they demonstrate a strong record in health and safety and have
approved health and safety programs in place.124 As part of the
application process, OSHA conducts a rigorous "pre-approval
review" that provides the Agency with information about firms'
health and safety measures. 125 OSHA also goes on-site to in-
spect the employer's past safety records, review its policies and
procedures for ensuring health and safety, and interview man-
PROJECT XL 11-13 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 99-35-
REV, 2000); John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A. and Arizona Factory Agree on Inno-
vative Regulatory Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at A18; see also Daniel J.
Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation, 26 ENVTL. L.
457, 473 (1996); Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks and the
Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 67, 111 (1998-1999).
121. Thomas E. Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 17
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399, 435 (1998) ("The Clinton administration conceived Pro-
ject XL as a means of experimenting with new methods of controlling and re-
ducing pollution through pilot projects. The knowledge gained from the pro-
jects was supposed to facilitate the modification of environmental regulations
and controls."). For a further discussion of the purposes of Project XL, see
ALFRED A. MARCUS ET AL., REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
(2002); Dennis D. Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The EPA's Untold
Success Story, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 220-27 (2001).
122. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. at 27,287
(noting that one of the requirements is monitoring, reporting, and evaluation
of the program).
123. See Voluntary Protection Programs to Supplement Enforcement and
to Provide Safe and Healthful Working Conditions, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (Jul. 2,
1982).
124. See id. at 29,025. Of course, OSHA still reviews worker complaints
and accidents and retains its enforcement authority if the site is not meeting
its regulatory obligations. See id. at 29,030.
125. See id. at 29,030; see also Michael, supra note 30, at 559-61 (discuss-
ing generally the requirements for the program).
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agers and employees about the policies and controls. 126 These
visits ensure that facilities meet the program requirements, but
they also allow OSHA to secure a great deal of information
about workplace safety that it can later use to identify prob-
lems at nonparticipating firms. The participating firms, in re-
turn, escape from the regular rulebook inspections.
In 1993, the EPA launched an Environmental Leadership
Program (ELP), modeled on OSHA's VPP, which recognized in-
dustrial facilities that had delivered exemplary environmental
results. 12 7 This program, and other EPA programs like it, even-
tually grew into what the EPA now calls its National Environ-
mental Performance Track (NEPT). Through NEPT, the EPA
recognizes more than 300 facilities across the nation for their
environmental excellence. 12 8
Facilities admitted into OSHA's VPP and the EPA's NEPT
are eligible to join membership associations-the VPP Partici-
pants Association and the Performance Track Participants As-
sociation, respectively. These associations have regular meet-
ings with the agencies that provide beneficial opportunities for
industry representatives and agency staff to communicate.
Regulators report that that they have learned valuable infor-
mation from these programs about industry practices and
management techniques. 129 As one EPA official summed up the
information value from programs like the NEPT, "We need
people we can talk to."130
D. NONMANDATORY INFORMATION REQUESTS
Regulators can ask firms to provide information without of-
fering any rewards or threatening any penalties. 3 1 The OMB
126. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 29,030.
127. See Environmental Leadership Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,802 (Jan. 15,
1993).
128. EPA, National Environmental Performance Track: Basic Information,
available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/about.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004). Other forerunners to the NEPT included the Strategic Goals
Program in the metal finishing sector and the StarTrack program imple-
mented in EPA Region 1. See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational
Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law,
89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 954-56 (2001).
129. Id. at 955.
130. See supra note 57.
131. Even though such requests are technically nonbinding, some firms
may perceive that they have little choice but to cooperate. Here, we mean to
address instances where firms have, and perceive that they have, a choice
about whether to disclose. However, in many cases what looks like a voluntary
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estimates that 21.9% of authorized information collection re-
quests "are voluntary where a response is entirely discretionary
and has no direct effect on any benefit or privilege for the re-
spondent."132 Undoubtedly, many more such requests are either
made without authorization or do not rise to the level where
OMB authorization is needed.
Regulators often send voluntary surveys to firms to collect
data on regulatory problems, industry conditions, and the fi-
nancial costs of regulation. For example, the EPA has surveyed
regulated water systems about every five years since 1976,133
collecting information about the current conditions of water
systems to help it calculate the costs of drinking water regula-
tions and assess any potential needs for new water quality
technologies. 134 In 2000, the Agency surveyed about 1800 dif-
ferent water systems, mailing surveys to about 1200 medium
and large systems and sending representatives from consulting
firms to collect data in person from 603 small systems. The re-
sponse rate for the small systems was ninety percent, while the
rate for all systems was sixty-nine percent. 135
In the late 1980s, OSHA surveyed more than 5000 compa-
nies on the use of personal protective equipment, such as safety
goggles and hearing protectors, in various industrial sectors. 136
The study was designed to enable OSHA to identify workplace
risks, determine the feasibility of new or revised standards, and
provide a baseline for assessing the effectiveness of any regula-
tory changes. 137 To help ensure the adequacy and accuracy of
request may well be tacitly backed up with some threat of punitive response
for those who do not participate.
132. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 89, at 7. Even purely volun-
tary surveys must still receive approval by the OMB under the Paperwork Re-
duction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-08 (2000). See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Pa-
perwork Redux: The (Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 111, 114 (1997). The burden on responding companies with respect to
cost and time is one factor that the OMB considers when deciding whether to
approve information collection requests by agencies.
133. Agency Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Com-
ment Request; Community Water System Survey, 65 Fed. Reg. 7544 (Feb. 15,
2000) (describing the purpose and design of the survey).
134. Id. at 7545.
135. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COMMUNITY WATER
SYSTEM SURVEY 2000 vi (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/
consumer/cwss_2000_volumeji.pdf.
136. See Agency Information Collection Activities Under OMB Review;
Personal Protective Equipment, Survey, 53 Fed. Reg. 28,462 (Jul. 28, 1988).
137. Id.
2004]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
responses, OSHA conducted the survey by telephone and used
strict measures to protect the confidentiality of survey re-
sponses.
Regulators also can ask firms to submit to voluntary in-
spections. Following September 11, 2001, the EPA asked sev-
eral dozen chemical facilities to submit to site visits so the A-
gency could gather information about the adequacy of security
practices at chemical facilities, as well as assess security vul-
nerabilities and identify potential solutions. 138 The EPA cur-
rently has little legal authority to compel firms to submit to
such inspections, but was able to elicit cooperation from a few
facilities. The FDA similarly had no authority to inspect ciga-
rette plants, but once Commissioner Kessler began to take an
interest in regulating tobacco, the CEO of Philip Morris agreed
to show the FDA around one of his company's facilities. 139 Until
that visit, "no one on the team [developing the FDA rule] had
ever been inside a tobacco manufacturing plant."140
Regulators need to be mindful of factors that cast doubt on
the generalizability of the findings from voluntary surveys or
site inspections. While regulations bind all the firms within a
sector, firms may be most eager to volunteer information when
they differ from their competitors. Regulators must also worry
about the accuracy of self-reported survey results, as firms' re-
sponses may be biased.
E. FORMAL INTERACTION
Formal interaction between industry and regulatory offi-
cials provides another mode of gathering information. Formal
interaction takes place in public and usually follows a variety of
procedural steps. Examples include public hearings, where
agency staff sit and listen to testimony from industry,' 4 ' as well
138. Neil Franz, ACC Pushes for Compromise on Security Legislation,
CHEMICAL WK., Dec. 18/25, 2002, at 12; James L. Nash, EPA Addresses
Chemical Site Security, Slowly, OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS, Dec. 20, 2002, at
http://www.occupationalhazards.comarticles/5314; Robert Westervelt, GAO
Calls for National Chemical Security Plan .... CHEMICAL WK., Mar. 26, 2003,
at 7.
139. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 140-41. Of course, this probably is an ex-
ample of the situation noted supra, in note 131, where a firm's cooperation was
not strictly voluntary. Given the background threat of the FDA regulating to-
bacco, Philip Morris most likely was using this gesture of voluntary disclosure
in an effort to stave off or at least mitigate the FDA's regulatory initiative.
140. Id. at 141.
141. Public hearings can take place as part of what is known as "formal
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as the written comments that industry and others submit to
the agency during the rulemaking process. 142 Industry tends to
submit the largest proportion of comments in most rulemak-
ings, comments that are often filled with extensive data, sug-
gestions, and objections that can sometimes span hundreds of
pages (and are undoubtedly mostly self-serving).143 All written
comments and transcripts from hearings are documented in an
agency's records and are available to the public. 144
The approximately 1000 advisory committees established
by federal regulatory agencies 145 provide another opportunity
for formal interaction. Congress has recognized that such advi-
sory groups "are frequently a useful and beneficial means of
furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions."'146 The
FAA, for example, uses the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC) "to obtain direct, firsthand information and
insight from the substantially affected interests [by] meeting
together and exchanging ideas with respect to proposed rules
and existing rules."147 ARAC advises the FAA on most major
policy issues, including equipment safety, flight crew training,
communication systems, and aircraft noise. The FAA believes
rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act, but proceedings that
require this on-the-record, trial-type procedure are much less common. How-
ever, public hearings can also be used to provide supplementary input into so-
called "informal" or "notice-and-comment" rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
142. The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that
agencies provide opportunities for public comment, specifically had in mind
that the "the objective should be to assure informed administrative action."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 31 (1947).
143. Coglianese, supra note 7, at 741 (noting that "industry groups (i.e.,
business firms and trade associations) participated the most" in the comment
process); see WESLEY MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING 40 (1986); Golden,
supra note 64, at 252-53.
144. Anyone interested in the information must still visit the agency to ob-
tain it, at least for most agencies. A few agencies, like the EPA and the De-
partment of Transportation, have begun to post all their comments in inter-
net-accessible dockets. Within a few years, regulatory comments submitted to
all agencies will probably be accessible online.
145. U.S. General Services Administration, FACA Database at FIDO GOV,
at http://fido.gov/facadatabase (last visited Oct. 4, 2004). The number of advi-
sory bodies is actually larger than the widely cited figure of 1000 because some
advisory committees have distinct subcommittees or other associated working
groups.
146. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2000).
147. FAA, Order No. 1110.119G, ARAC Charter, 1, available at http://www.
airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory-andGuidanceLibrary/rgOrders.nsf/O/c6e88dac 4 7 d
8418186256c4d006ed3b2/$FILE/1110.119G.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
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this information enables the Agency to craft "better rules in
less overall time."'148
In 1994, the EPA established a new advisory committee
that met regularly for several years in an effort to identify in-
novative approaches to environmental regulation across six in-
dustrial sectors. 149 Called the Common Sense Initiative (CSI)
Council, the advisory committee included about thirty repre-
sentatives from industry, trade associations, state and local
government, labor, environmental groups, and community or-
ganizations. 150 In addition, subcommittees were created for
each of the six sectors included in the CSI: metal finishing,
computers and electronics, automobile manufacturing, print-
ing, petroleum refining, and iron and steel. 151 Although the CSI
process did not ultimately lead to major changes in environ-
mental regulation, it did help inform EPA policymakers about
technical issues in each of its industrial sectors. 152 Indeed,
much of the activity undertaken in the CSI consisted of re-
search and information collection. 153
Formal interaction enables regulators to gather informa-
tion, but the openness associated with these processes limits
148. Id. The Department of Transportation employs similar committees,
with similar objectives, in its other branches, such as the Railroad Safety Ad-
visory Committee used by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Tech-
nical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee used by the Of-
fice of Pipeline Safety.
149. Common Sense Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee; Estab-
lishment, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,117 (Nov. 3, 1994).
150. See Case, supra note 115, at 41-43 (discussing the CSI program in
general).
151. Cary Coglianese & Laurie Allen, Does Consensus Make Common
Sense?, ENVIRONMENT, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 10, 13.
152. Id. at 14-17. Some observers of consensus-based advisory committees
like the CSI have argued that these processes help provide regulatory decision
makers with better information. See, e.g., Neil Eisner, Regulatory Negotiation:
A Real World Experience, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 371, 374 (1984) (concluding
that a negotiated rulemaking advisory committee established by the FAA re-
sulted in deliberations that "were informative" and that "a better understand-
ing of the problems was developed on all sides"). It is far from clear, however,
that information disclosure is significantly increased when advisory commit-
tees are charged with reaching a consensus on a regulatory proposal. See Cary
Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 386, 442 (2001) (noting that forms of interaction not organized
around consensus provide the same kinds of opportunities for public input and
that "it is the deliberation-not the consensus-that generates the information
that enables agencies to craft their policy decisions").
153. Coglianese & Allen, supra note 151, at 18 tbl.2.
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the sharing of information. 154 Less formal interaction facilitates
information transmission to regulators, just as it facilitates
gossip in everyday life. Advisory committees, which must in-
clude members of competing interests and be open to the pub-
lic, inhibit frank informational exchange between regulators
and industry. 15 5 While procedures that promote openness may
well help address concerns about illegitimate influence by in-
dustry on government policymaking, 156 they can hamper the
ability to gather information from industry. 157
F. INFORMAL INTERACTION
Informal interaction, which is not nearly as visible as for-
mal exchange, is a staple of regulatory life. 158 One of the ways
154. A recent empirical study of the public comment process confirms the
limitations of formal processes. See William F. West, Formal Procedures, In-
formal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy
Making, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004). In the study, out of sixteen proposed
rules that agencies changed prior to promulgation, "only one... was substan-
tially influenced by the introduction of new empirical information through
public comment." Id. at 71. In contrast, fourteen of the sixteen rules were
changed due to "[i]nformal political processes." Id. tbl.1.
155. David M. Welborn et al., Background Report for Recommendation
84.3, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 199, 247
(1984); Ashley C. Brown, Sunshine May Cloud Good Decision Making, FORUM
FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL'Y, Summer 1992, at 113. The burden associated
with establishing Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committees may
also limit the extent to which they are used by regulators. See Steven P.
Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 549 (1997). Whenever agencies convene
a series of ongoing meetings with a group of industry or other nongovernmen-
tal representatives, they must follow the requirements of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (2000). However, the requirements un-
der FACA do not apply to the individual and sporadic meetings with industry
that take place most frequently in regulatory policymaking. See Croley &
Funk, supra at 453, 475. FACA requires that agencies have balanced commit-
tee memberships drawn from different interest groups, that meetings be an-
nounced in advance and open to the public, and that the agency take accurate
minutes of the committee's proceedings. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5(b)(2), 10(a), 10(c)
(2000). For example, the OMB must approve all new proposals for advisory
committees. Management of Federal Advisory Committees, 59 Fed. Reg.
53,856, 53,856 (Oct. 5, 1994). The OMB has also established ceilings for the
number of advisory committees. Id.
156. Croley & Funk, supra note 155, at 453 (noting that in enacting FACA
Congress attempted to address concerns that "some interests had come to en-
joy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal executive decision makers").
157. See infra Part IV.D.
158. Over fifty percent of the Washington interest groups surveyed by Neil
Kerwin and Scott Furlong reported that government proactively initiated con-
tact with their organizations "on a regular basis." CORNELIUS M. KERWIN,
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regulators interact informally is by using the telephone. When
Justice Stephen Breyer taught regulatory policy at Harvard
Law School in the 1980s, he often remarked that picking up the
telephone was the most useful way for regulators to secure in-
formation.159 For example, in a recent rulemaking proceeding
on motorcycle brake systems, a staff member at NHTSA simply
called up a representative at the motorcycle trade association
to learn more about the effect of temperature on the friction be-
tween brake linings and discs. 160
In addition to the telephone, informal communication takes
place in person, in meetings that regulators hold with individ-
ual representatives from industry, and in working groups of
such representatives arranged in ways that avoid the require-
ments of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).161 Regu-
RULEMAKING 189 (3d ed. 2003). According to Kerwin, "a common reason for
these contacts is to get information for the rule under development." Id.; see
also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that
"informal contacts between agencies and the public are the 'bread and butter'
of the process of administration").
159. Over many years, then-Professor Breyer taught regulatory policy at
Harvard Law School with Richard Zeckhauser. More recently Justice Breyer
remarked that in developing a policy proposal it would be natural for govern-
ment personnel to "phone everyone in sight who knows about it." Oral Argu-
ment Transcript at 45, Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the D.C., 24 S.
Ct. 2576 (2004) (No. 03-475). Indeed, one of the potential concerns in that case
was that certain interpretations of FACA might "stop every lower level official
in government when he is creating legislative policy from getting on the phone
and calling up whoever he pleases." Id. at 36; see also BREYER, supra note 1, at
103 (noting that in developing a regulatory proposal agency "[s]taff members
will telephone, write letters to, and arrange meetings with independent ex-
perts, industry experts-in fact, anyone they consider knowledgeable").
160. Memorandum of George Soodoo, Division Leader, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (June 18, 2001), at http://dmses.dot.gov/
docimages/pdf66/133039_web.pdf.
161. FACA does not apply to all meetings between regulators and members
of industry. For example, agency officials are permitted to meet alone with
"any group... when advice is sought from the attendees on an individual ba-
sis and not from the group as a whole." Federal Advisory Committee Manage-
ment, 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.40(e) (2003). Moreover, meetings between a federal
official and any group for "the purpose of exchanging facts or information," as
opposed to giving advice or making a recommendation are permitted. § 102-
3.40(f); see also 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (2000) (defining an advisory committee as
one that is "established or utilized ... in the interest of obtaining advice or
recommendations"). But see Croley & Funk, supra note 155, at 486-88 (ques-
tioning this interpretation). Even meetings where advice is given can be ex-
cluded from FACA if the advice is given individually by participants, as op-
posed to meetings that lead to collective recommendations. See Federal
Advisory Committee Management, 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.40(e); Croley & Funk,
supra note 155. at 474- Finally ad hoc nr iinqfruc tf-lore anfl-sn genally
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lators also interact informally with industry personnel at pro-
fessional meetings, academic conferences, and wherever both
industry and government representatives are present.
162 By be-
ing available in settings where communication can take place
confidentially, regulators also provide a climate that is more
conducive to whistle-blowing.
Government regulators and industry representatives often
develop relationships over periods of years, or even decades,
and will work closely with each other on the development of
regulations. 163 As one EPA staff member explained:
We try to bring them in as early as possible on what we are required
to do and request their help very early on. And usually this is appre-
ciated because that way they have input as opposed to EPA unilater-
ally going out and looking at various textbooks and writing rules that
are ridiculous because we don't fully understand what the hell we are
regulating. So it works out better by working very closely with the
people that we are going to regulate and we do this in various
ways .... We meet with them[;] we have industry-agency workgroups
that will meet together.1 6
Another EPA staff member expressed the same thought: 'The
more information [industry groups] can help us with, the better
the rule will turn out-in their interest as well as everyone
else's."165
Industry representatives in Washington, D.C. also seek out
information from regulators and try to learn of opportunities to
influence the shape of regulatory policy. 166 As one corporate
need not meet FACA's requirements. See Croley & Funk, supra note 155, at
483-84.
162. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 7, at 750; cf. Steven Kelman, Remak-
ing Federal Procurement, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 581, 615 (2002) (advising gov-
ernment officials to "attend[] trade association or other professional meet-
ings.., as a way to get informal information"). Some settings are specifically
designed to promote such informal interaction. The Harvard Electricity Policy
Group (HEPG), established by our colleague, William Hogan, is an excellent
example. HEPG brings together representatives from industry, government,
academe, and environmental groups for discussions aimed at "informing and
analyzing" policy development. HARVARD ELEC. POLICY GROUP, RESHAPING
THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: A PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE 2 (June 2001), avail-
able at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/images/2001%20brochure.pdf.
163. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9
LAW & POLY 355, 367 (1987).
164. Coglianese, supra note 7, at 750-51.
165. Id. at 751.
166. Political scientists who study the role of interest groups in policymak-
ing have long acknowledged that lobbyists traffic in information. See LEWIS
ANTHONY DEXTER, How ORGANIZATIONS ARE REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON
130 (1969) ("The effective Washington representative provides influence for
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vice president for regulatory affairs remarked when asked
about his staff's relationship with regulators:
[Olur Washington office-they know the [EPA] regulators down in the
bowels of that agency personally. They are over there all the time;
they've become friends with them; they supply data and assist them
in any way that it's legitimate to do. So we have open communications
constantly about what they're thinking, what we'd like them to do,
what we think they're gonna [sic] do. It's almost like becoming joined
at the hip with the staff over there.167
In this way, informal interaction serves industry's interests as
well as government's needs, which means that regulators are in
a position to offer information about their plans to industry in
exchange for industry providing government with informa-
tion. 168
In formal regulatory proceedings conducted through a
trial-type hearing, such so-called ex parte communications are
prohibited under section 557(d)(1) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. However, there is no corresponding provision for ex
parte communications during informal or notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' controversial
decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,169 while subsequently
his client by acquiring and translating relevant information.") (emphasis omit-
ted).
167. Coglianese, supra note 7, at 751.
168. Id. at 750 (noting that "informational dependence ... lead[s] interest
group representatives and agency staff to find themselves engaged in ongoing
and often mutually beneficial relationships").
169. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Home Box Office, Inc., case involved a
challenge to an FCC rulemaking on subscription cable services. See id. at 17.One of the litigants argued that the FCC staff acted improperly by meeting
with broadcasters and other interest groups nearly thirty-five times after the
close of the Agency's formal time for soliciting public feedback. See id. at 53.The court agreed that secret deliberations with affected interests were incon-
sistent "with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and with
the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits which undergirds all of our
administrative law." Id. at 56. The court held that:
[o]nce a notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued ... any agency
official or employee ... should 'refus[e] to discuss matters relating to
the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any interested pri-
vate party ... prior to the [agency's] decision ....
Id. at 57 (quoting Exec. Order No. 11920 § 4, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.1040, 1041 (1976)). However, the court did not entirely ban agencies from en-
gaging in ex parte communications. Rather,
[i]f ex parte contacts [occur after the issuance of a notice of proposed
rulemaking], we think that any written document or a summary of
any oral communication must be placed in the public file establishedfor each rulemaking docket immediately after the communication is
received so that interested parties may comment thereon.
Id. Moreover, "communications which are received prior to issuance of a for-
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abandoned by the courts, 170 has been reinforced by agency poli-
cies requiring the documentation of informal contacts that take
place after the publication of a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing. 171 Even though some agencies require their staff to docu-
ment all ex parte communications whenever they occur, it is
extremely difficult to ensure that staff members comply fully
with these requirements. In addition, the memoranda that
agency staff members prepare to describe their ex parte com-
munications are often quite brief and formulaic. Since the in-
formal communications frequently involve contact with only a
single agency staff member, there is often no way to know for
sure whether documentation of ex parte communications is
complete. The upshot is that informal contacts with industry
continue to take place largely below the radar, especially prior
to the filing of a notice of proposed rulemaking.
1 72
mal notice of rulemaking do not, in general, have to be put in a public file." Id.
170. Since 1977, Home Box Office, Inc., has been construed narrowly by
subsequent courts to the point of virtual obsolescence as a judicial precedent.
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to fol-
low Home Box Office, Inc., requirement in EPA notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(declining to apply the ex parte requirement in Home Box Office, Inc., to
OSHA notice-and-comment rulemaking).
171. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 4, at 1056 (noting that "the general ap-
proach of HBO has been widely adopted, without legislative or judicial en-
forcement, by agency rulemakers"). For examples of agency policies reinforcing
the tenets of Home Box Office, Inc., see, e.g., DEP'T OF TRANSP., ORDER No.
2100.2 at 2 (1970), available at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/dot2lOO- 2 .pdf (re-
quiring prompt and public documentation of ex parte communications after
the publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking); Memorandum from
Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, to all
Employees (Aug. 6, 1993) (on file with author) (requiring rulemaking staff to
prepare a memorandum summarizing meetings or discussions held after a
rule has been proposed); Memorandum from William D. Ruckelshaus, Admin-
istrator, Environmental Protection Agency, to all EPA employees (May 19,
1983) (requiring Agency staff to place in the docket "a memorandum summa-
rizing any significant new factual information [or data] likely to affect the fi-
nal decision received during a meeting or other conversations"), noted in Press
Release, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Ruckelshaus Takes
Steps to Improve Flow of Agency Information [Fishbowl Policy] (May 19,
1983), available at http://www.epa.govhistory/topics/policy/fishbowl.htm;
Memorandum from Gerald H. Yamada, Deputy General Counsel, Environ-
mental Protection Agency (Mar. 1, 1990) (on file with author) (directing
Agency staff to include in the regulatory docket summaries of ex parte com-
munications).
172. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules 75 (1994) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author) ("In the rule
development phase, industry groups tend to dominate because of the informa-
tion they can provide to the agency staff as they write a rule.").
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One additional pattern of interaction deserves mention: the
so-called "revolving door."173 Movement by regulators from gov-
ernment into jobs within industry facilitates future informal
contacts between the regulatory agency and relevant firms or
trade associations. Similarly, movement by industry leaders
into government facilitates informal contacts and brings insid-
ers' knowledge about private firms into a regulatory agency. 174
FDA Commissioner David Kessler made sure to include on the
cigarette regulation project an FDA staff member who had pre-
viously worked for "the other side"-the tobacco industry.175
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION GAME
How can regulators best use the information-gathering tac-
tics at their disposal to gather reliable information from firms
that would prefer to remain silent? In this part, we connect the
information-gathering tactics presented in Part III with the
general informational strategies developed in Part II, showing
how the tactic of informal interaction serves both strategies
well. The strategic advantages of informal interaction hold
some striking implications for administrative law, which we
explain in the final section. For at least the past three decades,
administrative law has promoted greater procedural transpar-
ency of government decision making to discourage regulatory
capture and other special deals between regulators and the
firms they regulate. 176 Until now, however, the potential ad-
verse impacts of transparency and formalism on government's
ability to collect essential information from industry have been
largely overlooked.
A. CONNECTING TACTICS WITH STRATEGIES
We have identified two basic strategies that regulators
employ to secure information: exploit asymmetries of interests
173. See, e.g., William T. Gormley Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hy-
pothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 665 (1979).
174. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1, at 345 (noting that the NHTSA might
never have completed a rulemaking on tire labeling "had the job of doing so
not been placed in the hands of an Agency official who had previously worked
for a tire company for thirty-five years"). The issues we have raised about in-
formal contacts and the revolving door apply to groups other than business
organizations. Especially in Democratic administrations, environmentalists
and safety advocates get appointed to positions in relevant regulatory agen-
cies.
175. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 125.
176. See infra notes 206-15 and accompanying text.
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across or within firms, and create incentives for disclosure. To
play their game more effectively, regulators will wish to know
how various tactics match up with these strategies. In this sec-
tion, we connect the tactics with the general strategies in order
to provide a roadmap that reinforces both the tactics and the
strategies.
In matching tactics with strategies, some cases are clear.
Issuing subpoenas and rewarding disclosure are obvious ways
to create incentives. Nonmandatory requests for information
clearly, on the other hand, seek to exploit asymmetries of inter-
est, as the firms or facilities that open themselves up to volun-
tary inspection by the regulator, or that voluntarily respond to
information requests, presumably have an interest in being
forthright with the regulator.
177
In other situations, the connection between strategy and
tactics is murkier, at least at first glance. Making regulatory
approvals contingent on disclosure might appear to reward
firms for disclosing information, since firms only obtain their
license or other regulatory permission after they have provided
the regulator with information. Yet firms are rewarded only for
disclosing a certain kind of information-information favorable
to the firm-not when they disclose adverse information show-
ing their products or drugs are unsafe. Cases of fraud in FDA
applications for new drugs indicate that the tactic of condition-
ing approval on disclosure does not necessarily help the regula-
tor obtain information that most industrial players would pre-
fer not to reveal. 178 Linking approval to disclosure can
exacerbate industry's predisposition to disclose self-serving in-
formation.
Conditioning decisions on disclosure works best when
firms' disclosure interests are asymmetric-say, if the informa-
tion that helps one firm win regulatory approval also helps the
regulator in regulating other firms in the future, on the same
or some other issue. When the FDA relied on information sub-
mitted with tobacco company patent applications, it actually
177. Moreover, the fact that regulators treat surveys or inspections confi-
dentially means that participating firms can usually transmit information
without fear of any reprisals from others in their industry. In some cases, oth-
ers will know that the agency is asking for information, but they generally will
not be able to identify what information has actually been conveyed or by
whom.
178. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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exploited an asymmetry in interest that cut across time. 179
When they submitted patent applications, tobacco companies
had an interest in disclosing information about their ability to
manipulate nicotine to the Patent Office; they may not have
even envisioned that a different regulator, the FDA, would
later use that information against them in trying to regulate
cigarettes. Similarly, in large, compartmentalized organiza-
tions, individuals in one office may release certain information
when applying for regulatory approvals falling within their
domain, overlooking or underestimating the negative implica-
tions for future policymaking or on regulatory matters outside
their purview.
The tactic of formal interaction serves neither of the regu-
lators' main strategies very well. It generally places regulators
in a relatively passive role in which they receive information
but do not actively seek it. While information is obviously
transmitted in public hearings and formal comment periods, it
is only information that the parties want regulators to receive,
not necessarily the information that regulators most need. As
with respondents to nonmandatory requests for information,
those who attend hearings or take the time to file comments
are a self-selected group of interested parties. Moreover, unlike
with nonmandatory requests, formal modes of interaction such
as hearings and comment processes typically place regulators
in a reactive posture. Regulators must remain open to any and
all comments that the public wishes to convey on an issue,
which naturally limits their ability to direct the line of inquiry.
It is hard to see how regulators could make much use of such
passive modes to exploit asymmetric incentives or create new
ones. 180
Other types of formal interaction, such as advisory commit-
tees, may better enable regulators to exploit asymmetries or
create incentives for revealing adverse information. Since
membership on an advisory committee can reward firms by giv-
ing them greater access to the agency, the ability to appoint
members to these committees may allow regulators to reward
179. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
180. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens
Advisory Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 910(1998) ("While procedures like public hearings can be a good opportunity for
many people to hear presentations, to express their views, and perhaps to en-
gage in question-and-answer sessions, they cannot provide the forum for ex-
tensive development of information .... ).
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firms that have a track record of providing reliable and useful
information. However, a variety of factors constrain the effec-
tiveness of advisory committees. Once a committee is consti-
tuted, regulators have little opportunity within the confines of
the formal process to reward firms that reveal needed informa-
tion during committee deliberations. Any "deals" that the regu-
lator might like to make with individuals firms are inhibited by
the transparency of the advisory committee process. Also, advi-
sory committees must represent a balanced collection of mem-
bers so that regulators cannot merely appoint members from
firms that reveal information.' 8 ' Most important, the require-
ment that advisory committee deliberations remain open to the
public18 2 means that any firm's decision to break an industry's
collective silence would be known to those who could punish the
firm and its executives. For these reasons, advisory committees
do not provide regulators with a powerful tool for breaking in-
dustry silence. Surely the FDA never would have gathered
much information for its cigarette rulemaking by appointing
tobacco representatives to an advisory committee.
Advisory committees may make their chief contribution,
ironically, by facilitating informal interactions. Even though
regulators may not learn much from the formal meetings of ad-
visory committees, these sessions do give regulators and indus-
try representatives opportunities to get to know each other and
build relationships that can lead to productive informal inter-
action. In many cases, the most valuable communications
among members of advisory committees take place in the hall-
ways before or after the formal meetings or during breaks.
l8 3
181. Federal Advisory Committee Management, 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.60(b)(3)
(2003) (requiring agency plan to ensure that the agency strives "to attain
fairly balanced membership"). Of course, some advisory committees will be
more wide-ranging than others, based on the makeup of the interest group
community around the issue. On those issues that are relatively obscure or
technical, and where the interest group universe is relatively tight, it might be
possible for regulators to choose precisely the actors most likely to disclose. On
issues where there is a broader and more conflicted range of interests, this will
be harder to achieve.
182. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (2000). To be sure, agencies can always interact
with the members of advisory committees on an individual basis, outside of
the open committee process. In some cases, regulators may use the formal
process as a vehicle for forging closer relationships with potential sources of
information who the regulators then approach individually and informally
outside of the advisory committee process. For a related discussion of using a
mixture of strategies for securing information, see supra Part II.D.
183. See Kelman, supra note 162, at 615 ("The point is not what's on the
agenda; the point is what takes place at breaks and lunch."); Ellen Siegler,
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Informal interaction provides excellent opportunities for
regulators to use both information-gathering strategies. They
can telephone those whom they believe are more disposed to
talk and reward firms that participate through informal trades.
The quid pro quos can consist of information from the agency or
potentially desirable treatment in regulatory action. Agencies
can also informally punish firms that refuse to disclose infor-
mation by reducing access to the agency or subtly slowing the
agency's responsiveness on other matters. We develop the vir-
tues of informal interaction more fully in the next section.184
To summarize, Table 1 shows the connections between the
basic informational strategies and the six main tactics. To cre-
ate incentives for disclosure, the best tactics are: (1) mandating
disclosure, (2) creating rewards for disclosure (such as through
recognition programs like the EPA's National Environmental
Performance Track), and (3) engaging in more subtle manipula-
tion of interests through informal interaction. When regulators
seek to exploit asymmetries, they should: (1) issue non-
mandatory requests and take advantage of the information
provided by volunteers, or (2) seek firms more inclined to dis-
close through informal (and hence more hidden) interaction.
Relying on information provided in licensing or other approval
processes where decisions are conditioned on disclosure will
generally only help for policy issues that are more tangentially
related to the approval processes. Finally, formal interaction,
though perhaps serving purposes other than information acqui-
sition, generally will not effectively advance either strategy for
gathering adverse information.
B. THE VIRTUES OF INFORMALITY
Throughout the world, proponents of good government fa-
vor increased transparency (and thus usually formality) in
regulatory decision making.18 5 Informality is often viewed as
Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,647,
10,648-49 (1992) (observing from personal experience that extensive commu-
nication takes place outside of the public sessions of negotiated rulemaking
advisory committees).
184. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
185. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD REPORT ON
REGULATORY REFORM 14 (1997) (noting that "[l]ack of transparency is a key
problem" in OECD countries); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
STRENGTHENING REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY, (OECD Working Papers, Vol.
8, No. 68, 2000) (discussing the importance of transparency in domestic regu-
latory systems); Mock, supra note 44, at 1099 ("[T]ransparency is coming tn h
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Table 1: Potential Contributions of
Information Tactics to Strategies
Strategy
Exploit Create
Tactic Asymmetries Incentives
Contingent Decisions Medium Low
Mandated Disclosure Low High
Rewards and Recognition Low High
Nonmandatory Requests High Low
Formal Interaction Medium Low
Informal Interaction High High
suspect by reviewing courts and others who fear that informal
business-government interaction will result in regulatory poli-
cies that favor industry over the broader interests of society.
186
Yet from the standpoint of the information game, these fears
are misplaced: industry will not hesitate to provide the gov-
ernment with the kind of information that would support poli-
cies that favor industry, whether the process is formal or in-
formal. 187 To obtain information needed to advance society's
interests at the expense of industry interests, regulators must
exploit or create different interests in disclosure, strategies
that are actually made more cumbersome by formal, transpar-
ent processes. Whatever the drawbacks to informality, it pos-
recognized as essential to good governance and to establishment of the rule of
law within ordered societies.").
186. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2267 (2001) (noting that interaction taking place in "informal and
nontransparent ways" has led to "concerns about inequalities of interest group
access and resulting agency capture"); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1770 (1975) (noting
that because "bias in agency policies is often attributed to informal decisions,
courts have imposed requirements that force agencies to adopt formal proce-
dures"). An emphasis on formality has also been observed in the U.S. regula-
tory enforcement process, another regulatory setting characterized by infor-
mation asymmetries between the regulator and the regulated. See, e.g., Steven
Kelman, Enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Regulations, in
ENFORCING REGULATION 97, 99 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds.,
1984) (noting that "[p]erhaps the best single word to describe the American
enforcement process... is formal").
187. Of course, the concern may center less on information than on firms
using informality to offer explicit or implicit bribes to government officials. We
discuss implicit trades for information in more detail in Part IV.D.
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sesses distinct advantages for extracting adverse informa-
tion.188
Informal interaction enables regulators to be more proac-
tive and nimble in their efforts to gather information, partly
due to the lower costs associated with informality.18 9 It is very
easy to pick up the phone and call a contact in industry. It is
also usually less costly to craft and calibrate incentives when
proceeding informally. Simply failing to return a phone call or
to invite a trade association representative to an important
meeting are cheap ways to punish an uncooperative firm. Re-
turning phone calls, sharing information about agency initia-
tives, or involving industry in key meetings are cheap ways to
reward cooperative firms. 190
Informality also preserves the regulator's discretion and
protects the privacy of communications, allowing regulators to
target discreetly those firms that are more likely to disclose.
When firms disclose information informally, other firms are
less likely to know this, so the revealing firms and their execu-
tives will be less vulnerable to retribution. The opaque nature
of informal interaction allows regulators to create incentives for
disclosure without being accused of having created special
deals, which they are in fact making, or of having treated firms
unfairly by punishing them for failing to share information.' 91
Regulators and industry representatives who interact with
each other repeatedly will tacitly understand the incentives
that regulators create informally, but these same incentives
will often be nearly invisible to others.
188. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Infor-
mal contacts may enable the agency to... spur the provision of information
which the agency needs."); KERWIN, supra note 158, at 192 (noting that "in-
formal mechanisms and difficult-to-observe mechanisms for communicating
views to agencies are used a great deal and are thought to be as or more effec-
tive than the traditional means-such as written comment-that figure so
prominently in the procedural law and academic literature on rulemaking").
189. See supra Part III.F.
190. These rewards and punishments may seem insignificant, but to firms
in heavily regulated industries, the loss of reciprocal cooperation can be quite
significant. These players know that even though they may make strenuous
substantive objections to agency proposals, it is not in their interest to play
hardball with regulatory staff. See Coglianese, supra note 7.
191. Making the case for punishing nondisclosure is usually difficult. After
all, if a firm failed to disclose information, it may be because there was noth-
ing to disclose or it may be because the firm was uncooperative. Since the
"crime" of nondisclosure or inadequate disclosure seldom has its corpus delecti(dead body), regulators' efforts at punishment for nondisclosure will often be
susceptible to charges of unfairness.
330 [89:277
SEEKING TRUTH FOR POWER
The opaque nature of informal interaction helps to pre-
serve deniability. Though deniability can be used to hide ac-
tions that are illegal or inconsistent with the public interest, it
also provides cover for whistle-blowers, firms that volunteer in-
formation adverse to others in their industry, and well-
meaning regulators who need to make deals to gain crucial in-
formation. The pressures that work against the revelation of
adverse information can be significant, but the ability to com-
municate confidentially increases the likelihood of transmitting
socially valuable information. 192
Deniability is especially important for representatives of
trade associations, who often negotiate with both the agency
and the managers and firms that they represent. 193 In order to
win the favor of regulators, trade association representatives
will sometimes provide information off the record, such as in-
formation about industry's general "bottom line." Individual
lobbyists sometimes privately tell regulators that their indus-
try will not ultimately challenge a specific policy provision,
even as they maintain a public posture of resistance. As with
leaks of government information to the press, those who pro-
vide the information to the government often need to preserve
deniability for what they have disclosed.
Much more than with formal interaction, informal interac-
tion allows government to derive information from the behavior
of firms, not just from what they say. Regulators draw infer-
ences about the intensity of different firms' interests from the
extent of their involvement on specific regulatory issues.
194
Such intensities are better uncovered by informal processes, in
which firms choose their own level of participation, than in
formal processes which-due to their focus on fairness-tend to
foster more equal levels of participation.
Extensive and active resistance to a regulation suggests
that firms have information that the regulation will impose
high compliance costs. 195 Firms will overstate these costs, but
192. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 4, at 927 ("W here the government must
solicit cooperation rather than force disclosure, confidentiality may have to be
assured for that cooperation to be forthcoming.").
193. CARY COGLIANESE, UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION: MEMBERSHIP INPUT
AND INTEREST GROUP DECISION-MAKING (Politics Research Group, Working
Paper No. 96-02, 1996), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edulprg/cary/un
equal.htm.
194. See RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 3, 7, 237 (1996)
(discussing the role of intensities of interests).
195. See Johnston, supra note 13, at 1353-54, 1366.
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reveal their intensity through their observable lobbying ef-
forts. 196 Moreover, when informal relationships with govern-
ment are ongoing, firms are more constrained in their ability to
overstate; they cannot repeatedly threaten that they are going
to close down in the face of regulatory action without losing
credibility.
For these reasons, regulators should rely on informal tac-
tics before resorting to formal ones. Even when they are insuf-
ficient, informal tactics can inform regulators' use of other tac-
tics, such as issuing subpoenas. To issue effective mandatory
information requests, regulators need to know what to ask, and
informal, off-the-record conversations can point the way. For
example, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer took advan-
tage of informal tips provided by industry insiders to lay the
groundwork for several formal investigations of financial mar-
kets by his office and the SEC.197
C. DISCERNING TRUTH FROM A POSITION OF IGNORANCE
Information collection is ultimately about finding truth.
How do regulators judge whether they have obtained accurate
information? As former FDA Commissioner David Kessler has
commented, "Because we did not understand exactly what we
were looking for, we did not know how to press the company for
more information. And when the company gave us answers, we
had no way to challenge them."198 While this problem can never
196. Regulators do not need to see the lobbyists' actual expenditures to
draw these inferences, as has sometimes been suggested. See, e.g., Matthew D.
Adler, The Positive Political Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1429, 1442-43 (2002). Instead, regulators can gauge a firm's relative
level of interest by comparing its lobbying on one issue with its lobbying on
other issues-or with lobbying by other firms of comparable size on other is-
sues.
197. See, e.g., Abigail Rayner, Ten-Minute Call Sparked Inquiry, TIMES
(London), Dec. 10, 2003, at 33. The charges filed against Putnam Investments
for market timing followed a tip-off by an employee at a Putnam call-center to
Massachusetts' regulators. John Hechinger, How One Call Taker Spurred the
Putnam Mutual-Fund Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003, at C1.
198. KESSLER, supra note 31, at 182. This problem is compounded when, as
happens on many important regulatory issues, regulators actually have before
them an abundance of bits of data given to them by industry, but they need to
know which of these bits are accurate and relevant. This is why, earlier in this
Article, in defining the problem of collective "silence," we made a point to ac-
knowledge that we were making a simplifying assumption in treating disclo-
sure as a binary choice. See supra note 46. Even if this assumption were re-
laxed, the problem we have elucidated in this Article remains basically the
snmp. The collective. qilence prohle~m ik nnt nwcess .rily a problm nf getting in-
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be fully overcome, regulators can address it in two principal
ways.
The first is to draw upon multiple sources of information, a
method social scientists call triangulation. 199 If different
sources and methods generate reasonably consistent answers,
then regulators can have greater confidence in the accuracy of
the information. 20 0 If the information proves inconsistent, regu-
lators must consider the interests of those providing informa-
tion and their reputations for credibility.
When regulators routinely seek out multiple sources of in-
formation, firms have an added incentive to be honest, knowing
that others will provide a check on what they say. 20 1 In addi-
tion, the more sources the regulator approaches, the more
likely one or more will squeal. Not surprisingly, regulators and
former regulators have told us that they gather information by
pursuing many different avenues, seeking information from
multiple sources. They vet information gathered from one
source using other sources; employ information obtained
through one tactic to bolster and refine other tactics; and some-
times bring parties with disparate interests together to test
competing claims in informal, adversarial meetings.
20 2
Regulators can also improve the reliability of information
by fostering closer and longer relationships with industry.
While close, ongoing relationships between regulators and in-
dustry have long been deplored, often characterized pejora-
dustry to say something at all, but rather of getting firms to say something
accurate when doing so would ordinarily be against their interests.
199. Alan Bryman, Triangulation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH METHODS 1142-43 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al. eds., 2004).
200. If the information is not consistent, regulators should consider the in-
terests of those providing the information and their reputations for credibility.
If some firms provide data showing that a regulation will be extremely costly,
but other similar firms in the same industry provide data showing that it will
not be as costly, regulators might appropriately discount the data provided by
the first set of firms, as claims of high compliance costs are self-serving. The
claims by firms reporting lower compliance costs will be properly viewed as
more credible, all other things being equal. On the other hand, if industry re-
ports that compliance costs will be high but consumer or environmental activ-
ists provide information indicating that the costs will be low, then without
anything further regulators will be unable to credit either of the two claims,
since the information provided by consumer groups would also be self-serving.
201. This can also serve as a check on any "groupthink" bias that might
emerge over time in government's ongoing relationships with industry.
202. David Kessler's account of the FDA's efforts to regulate cigarettes is a
good illustration of how an agency deploys multiple tactics and tries to trian-
gulate. See KESSLER, supra note 31.
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tively as "cozy iron triangles, 203 they also allow regulators and
representatives from industry to learn to cooperate with each
other and gain a basis for establishing credibility and trust.204
A firm may wish to distort information given to the regulator in
any given round of the regulatory game, but if the regulator
uncovers a deception it can retaliate against the firm in later
rounds (albeit perhaps in subtle ways). For heavily regulated
industries, regulators are civil servants who tend to remain in
their positions for a long time; hence, the shadow of the future
will be long.205
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
For at least the past half-century, social scientists and le-
gal scholars have viewed closeness between regulators and in-
dustry as a matter of concern, a problem to be overcome
through the design of administrative law.20 6 Closeness has im-
plied influence and bias, the risk of regulatory capture, and the
creation of regulatory policy that systematically favors the in-
terests of industry. 20 7 As a result, administrative law has
through the years aimed to make the regulatory process more
transparent, with little concern for the regulator's information
deficit. 208
203. DOUGLASS CATER, POWER IN WASHINGTON (1964). The more neutral
terms are "issue networks" and "regulatory cultures." Thomas L. Gais et al.,
Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American
National Government, 14 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 161 (1984); Hugh Heclo, Issue
Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM 87, 102-05 (Anthony King ed., 1978); Meidinger, supra note 163;
Mark A. Peterson, Political Influence in the 1990s: From Iron Triangles to Pol-
icy Networks, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 395 (1993).
204. See Coglianese, supra note 7, at 749-53.
205. See id. at 753.
206. See, e.g., THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1979); Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669 (1975).
207. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bu-
reaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) ("According to the cap-
ture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input into deliberation about
the public interest, industry representatives co-opt governmental regulatory
power in order to satisfy their private desires.").
208. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977)("[S]ecrecy [is inconsistent] with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in
due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits
which undergirds all of our administrative law."); Slater Steels Corp. v. United
States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1379 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) ("Agency transpar-
ency is a cornerstone of administrative law."); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globaliza-
tion. Democracy, and tho AVeTd fnr n Ta,,, Ad,,,; , Taw,,, L... 10 I ),, j
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Congress has pronounced that it is "the policy of the
United States that the public is entitled to the fullest practica-
ble information regarding the decision-making processes of the
Federal Government." 20 9  This general commitment runs
throughout administrative law.2 10 For example, the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) was adopted "to pierce the veil of ad-
ministrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny."211 As such, FOIA established a presumption
that government records will be accessible to the public.2 12 For
similar reasons, the Government in Sunshine Act and FACA
require that critical regulatory meetings be announced in ad-
vance and made open to the public.2 13 Regulators are expected
to document ex parte communications that occur after the pub-
lication of a notice of proposed rulemaking. 214 In addition, regu-
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 147 (2003) ("Administrative law has always been
grounded upon basic norms. These norms include transparency, participation,
and fairness .... ); Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law, in 1
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 85-88
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Bates eds., 2001) ("Transparent procedures and op-
portunities for public input give organized interests an ability to represent
themselves, and their constituencies, in the administrative process.... These
procedures may also protect against regulatory capture .. "); Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1043 (1997) (noting the judicial thrust toward "changing the procedural
rules that govern agency decision making ... [to] force agencies to open their
doors-and their minds-to formerly unrepresented points of view, with the
result that capture would be eliminated or at least reduced"); James T.
O'Reilly, 'Access to Records" Versus 'Access to Evil" Should Disclosure Laws
Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
559, 559 (2003) ("The momentum supporting the 'freedom of information' con-
cept has been flowing in only one direction, toward greater transparency and
greater dissemination of more government information .. "); Martin Shapiro,
Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance,
8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 376 (2001) ("[A] fascination with transpar-
ency and participation remains central to administrative law.").
209. Government in Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (de-
claration of policy) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000)). The values
served by open government have also been said to be embedded within the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683
(6th Cir. 2002) ("[The Framers of the First Amendment] protected the people
against secret government.").
210. Americans exhibit what Professor James O'Reilly has called an "in-
formation entitlement." O'Reilly, supra note 208, at 560 ("[Ihe cultural expec-
tation persists that 'government secrecy' is anathema.").
211. Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974) (cita-
tions omitted).
212. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
213. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000); 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (2000).
214. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
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lators must provide reasons for their policies and must base
their decisions on an administrative record that is available to
the public as well as to courts and members of Congress. 215
These rules aim to prevent abuses and systematic bias,
which are genuine concerns. 216 Nevertheless, they also con-
strain the ability of well-intentioned regulators to secure the
reliable information they need to make better decisions.2 17 Ad-
ministrative law developments that make the regulatory proc-
ess more transparent dampen the leverage the regulator has
over industry in the information game. For example, under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, an agency must publish information
twice a year about all the regulations it has in development,2 18
and FOIA obligates agencies to disclose internal agency docu-
ments whenever industry requests them. 219 These laws weaken
the regulator's position vis-A-vis industry in the information
game, even though they do serve important values in a democ-
racy. In the absence of these laws, regulators could be more se-
lective about sharing such information, providing it more read-
ily to those who in return provide the agency with information
it needs. 220
215. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 48-49 (1983). The presumption of judicial review combined with the estab-
lishment of executive and legislative oversight embeds regulatory policymak-
ing within a constitutional system of checks and balances designed to keep de-
cision making from being based on a narrow set of interests or factions. See
Seidenfeld, supra note 207; Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the
APA, 72 VIRG. L. REV. 271 (1986).
216. See Mock, supra note 44, at 1092 ("Transparency about government
operations and the finances of government officials is a primary means of de-
terring corruption and of uncovering it when it occurs."); see also id. at 1093
("[Transparency has value in preventing and revealing rent-seeking.").
217. For a related argument, see Ashley C. Brown, The Duty of Regulators
to Have Ex Parte Communications, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2002, at 10, avail-
able at http://www.electricity-online.com/online.html.
218. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2000).
219. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
220. Of course, even with these laws, agencies still may be able to trade on
the slippage between the law on the books and the law in action. They may, for
example, be able to trade on more fine-grained information about the agency
that cannot be obtained in any way other than through information trades.
Moreover, just as mandatory disclosure is a limited tool for regulators, the
mandatory disclosure requirements imposed upon agencies may be construed
narrowly or evaded by regulators wishing to preserve some information for
strategic purposes. This is why large and sophisticated industry players still
acknowledge an advantage to becoming "joined at the hip" with the regulatory
a gnny. &-e suprn nnt 1 67 and arnmpanying text.
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Transparency also can undercut regulators' ability to elicit
information from firms that might fear retribution. Regulators
do not want to risk exposing their best sources of information
within industry, just as those who work for national security
and intelligence agencies want to avoid exposing their sources.
A bit of opacity protects the privacy of sources, and may allow
firms or their representatives to be more forthcoming and hon-
est about sharing adverse information.
221
Requiring complete transparency about virtually every
conversation in government, though perhaps now technologi-
cally possible,222 would make regulators' jobs much more diffi-
cult.223 What is needed is neither total transparency nor total
opacity, but rather a mix that mitigates the risk of regulatory
bias, whether from cognitive bias or outright corruption, and
preserves some room for regulators to interact privately with
industry in order to create openings in industry's wall of si-
lence.
Despite administrative law's overall trend toward trans-
parency, a few procedural features still leave some room for
regulators to play the information game. For example, agency
procedures, as well as even the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in
Home Box Office, Inc., do not prohibit ex parte communications
altogether, nor do they generally require agency staff members
to document all of their ex parte communications. 224 Rather,
they only require documentation of those communications tak-
ing place after the agency issues a proposed rule. 225 Not sur-
prisingly, interest groups have come to engage in extensive in-
221. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 4, at 915 (acknowledging that, as a result
of government transparency laws, "companies are less willing to cooperate
with agencies' requests for their documents").
222. Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in Rulemak-
ing, KSG Working Papers Series No. RW03-022, at http://ssrn.comlabstract
=421161 (Apr. 2003) ("[A]dvances in digital technology now make it feasible
for agency staff ... to creat[e] a digital recording of their ex parte communica-
tions.., and load[] digital audio files onto the agency's on-line docket.").
223. Our point is not simply that transparency requirements can impose
administrative burdens on agency officials, such as when they must divert
their time to respond to information requests. See Antonin Scalia, The Free-
dom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14,
16 (noting that it costs the gcvernment "many millions of dollars" to process
FOIA requests). Rather, transparency also imposes another, heretofore unac-
knowledged, cost by making it more difficult for regulators to obtain adverse
information from industry.
224. See supra notes 169-71.
225. See supra notes 169-71.
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formal communication with regulators before any proposed
rules are announced. 226
Even FOJA preserves some protection for the privacy of
business information by exempting certain types of records
from required disclosure, including national security docu-
ments, personnel records, and trade secrets or other confiden-
tial business information.227 Significantly, the D.C. Circuit,
concerned with the impact of disclosure on future government
efforts to secure information, has held that FOIA requires addi-
tional protection for confidential business information that in-
dustry voluntarily provides to government. 228 Congress has also
recently added new protections against disclosure under FOIA
for confidential information provided voluntarily by industry on
"critical infrastructure," such as telecommunications, energy,
financial, and transportation systems. 229 These measures strike
a balance between openness and government's need to protect
industry's confidential exchange of information with govern-
ment regulators. 230
226. KERWIN, supra note 158, at 186-92.
227. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000). FOIA does not prohibit the government
from releasing confidential business information. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441U.S. 281, 292-93 (1979). Executive Order 12,600, however, directs agencies to
notify firms prior to releasing any information they have submitted that is
"arguably" exempt from FOIA, giving the firms opportunity to seek judicial
review of the agency's decision to release. Predisclosure Notification Proce-
dures for Confidential Commercial Information, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,781 (June 25,1987). In addition, information falling within the narrower category of trade
secrets must be protected under the terms of the Trade Secrets Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905 (2000).
228. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975
F. 2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (finding that disclosure under FOIA
of voluntarily disclosed business information "would frustrate Congress's pur-pose of 'encouraging cooperation with the Government by persons having in-
formation useful to officials"' (quoting Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1974))).
229. See Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 133(West. Supp. 2004). For a discussion of this Act, see Rena Steinzor, "Democra-
cies Die Behind Closed Doors': The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Ac-
countability, 12 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY 641 (2003); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl,
The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public's Right toKnow, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 261 (2003).
230. In addition, lurking beneath the recent Supreme Court litigation in-
volving Vice President Cheney's energy task force was a policy dispute over
the balance between transparency and governmental effectiveness. Cheney v.
United States Dist. Court. of the D.C., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). Although theCourt did not address the underlying FACA issue, the vice president had ar-gued that discovery of executive branch communicstinns would inhibit candid
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Against administrative law's overall march toward greater
transparency, these measures stand out in their recognition of
how government regulators must acquire information from in-
dustry. While transparency has important virtues, some level
of informality and confidentiality is also needed if government
is to preserve its ability to play the information game effec-
tively. 231
We recognize that informal relationships between regula-
tors and industry bring potential problems, and that transpar-
ency offers important virtues. Indeed, our analysis of the in-
formation game leads us to call attention to an important but
frequently overlooked tradeoff facing the design of administra-
tive law. The challenge is to minimize the sum of two compet-
ing types of errors: (1) those associated with agency bias and
nefarious conduct, and (2) those associated with regulators'
failure to secure necessary information. Recognizing the trade-
off involved in addressing these competing errors represents an
important step. It opens up a major avenue for future research
and analysis; ultimately it should make it easier to find solu-
tions that minimize the sum of the two error types.
232 Such so-
lutions may vary across agencies and regulatory problems, but
they will involve striking some balance between opacity and
transparency.
One kind of balance could be struck by keeping parts of the
regulatory process confidential, but only for limited periods. Af-
ter the period of confidentiality had lapsed (say, after three to
five years), agencies would need to release records of their
communications with outsiders. Assurance of confidentiality
might give sufficient cover to facilitate information exchange,
and effective advice to the president. Against this need, amici favoring disclo-
sure argued that "representative democracy can succeed only if information
about government is broadly available" and that "secrecy is antithetical to rep-
resentative government." Brief for Amicus Curiae American Library Associa-
tion at 6, Cheney v. United States Dist. Court of the D.C., 124 S. Ct. 2576
(2004) (No. 03-475).
231. To say that some level of informality and opacity is needed, of course,
is not to say that it alone is sufficient for optimal information acquisition by
government. Other factors can affect an agency's ability to gather information,
such as the talent and training of its workforce, its budgetary resources, and
any procedural or legal barriers that may impede the collection of information.
232. Scholars have recognized the existence of risk-risk tradeoffs in health
and safety regulation. See, e.g., RISK VERSUS RISK (John D. Graham & Jona-
than Baert Wiener eds., 1995). The basic structure of the tradeoff in the in-
formation game is the same, only it is a tradeoff between the risk of bias and
the risk of ignorance.
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but general awareness of a subsequent release could counteract
temptations to abuse secrecy.
Another option is to keep parts of the regulatory process
opaque but impose penalties for demonstrably objectionable
conduct. 233 Given that opacity can be expected to lead to infor-
mal trading in information, greater care should be taken to
avoid coercion or corrupt actions. Thus, auditing for such
abuses by senior managers, agency inspector generals, or the
Government Accountability Office should be in place, along
with adequate penalties.
Finally, it bears noting that the amount of opacity that can
occur in the administrative process is limited by the expecta-
tion that agency actions be supported by reasoned explana-
tions, based on an available agency record. Courts, legislators,
and others will continue to demand reasoned explanations of
agencies' regulatory decisions. 234 As a result, agency officials
can talk secretly with industry to ferret out adverse informa-
tion, but information critical to any new regulation must still
form part of the agency's public justification. As a result, any
lead or information obtained through opaque channels subse-
quently needs to be corroborated through more open means, in-
cluding the possibility of mandated disclosure.
The tradeoff between protecting against bias and ensuring
regulators obtain necessary information means that transpar-
ency should not become transcendent in administrative law.
Rather, the goal for administrative law lies in balancing be-
tween transparency and opacity along the lines of the alterna-
tives we have outlined.
CONCLUSION
Regulators must rely on industry for significant amounts of
information they need to craft effective and efficient regulatory
policies. However, it is often not in a firm's or an industry's in-
terest to provide that information. By working closely and in-
formally with industry, regulators can identify specific firms or
233. Cf. supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
234. In Sierra Club v. Costle, Judge Wald offered a similar argument for
the court's decision to permit agencies to engage in ex parte communications
during informal rulemaking. 657 F.2d 298, 400-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981). After ex-plaining some of the virtues and vices of informal contacts in rulemaking, she
suggested that the vices would be counteracted by the requirement that the
"EPA must justify its rulemaking solely on the basis of the record it compiles
and makes public." Id. at 401.
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employees whose interests in disclosure might differ from those
of their competitors. Regulators can also try to create incen-
tives-rewards and punishments-that might lead some firms
to break with the industry's collective silence. Both strategies
are easier to pursue when regulators can interact informally
with industry in ways that are not transparent to others, in-
cluding the overall public.
Ensuring that regulators make adequately informed deci-
sions will demand that procedural designers resist any tempta-
tion to require total transparency. Transparency combats the
dangers of cozy relationships between regulators and industry,
to be sure, but it also detracts from regulators' abilities to ex-
ploit asymmetries of interest across firms and to engage in in-
formal interactions. The challenge for administrative law is
therefore to find an optimal level of visibility, one that mini-
mizes both the problems that transparency seeks to combat and
the problems resulting from ill-informed decision making.
Striking the appropriate balance will require recognizing that
sometimes government best advances the public interest by
giving a company rewards in exchange for information or en-
gaging in informal, off-the-record conversations, even though
this behavior may appear indistinguishable from the kind of
corruption or regulatory capture that administrative law has
long sought to prevent. Regulatory procedures need to allow
regulators to extract information from industry yet also coun-
teract the kind of regulatory capture that has long been prop-
erly deplored.
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